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ARTICLES
Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law
David Fontana† and Aziz Z. Huq††
In Federalist 51, James Madison offered what has become the canonical account of how the separation of powers would pit branch against branch for the
greater good. The officials of an institution would act on behalf of their institution
for the Constitution to function properly. In Madison’s account, ensuring the presence of the right quantum of institutional loyalties would serve as a durable and
plausible mechanism for enforcing institutional boundaries and ensuring a stable
constitutional order. But modern scholars take a more skeptical view of his theory.
This Article reconsiders the Madisonian concept of institutional loyalty as an object
of analysis for constitutional scholars and jurists. Our core thesis is that institutional loyalty can be identified, evaluated, and even elicited through conscious and
careful institutional design. We first provide a definition of institutional loyalty and
situate the concept in the American constitutional past and present. We then marshal evidence that institutional loyalty may well have been decisive in some contemporary interbranch dynamics, even if its effects are inconstant and asymmetrical. In
particular, we suggest that loyalties’ effects in the executive and judiciary are greater
than their effect in the legislative context. We caution, however, that it is a mistake
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to view institutional loyalties as a constitutional end in themselves. Rather, institutional loyalty can promote or undermine structural constitutional goals, depending
on the circumstances. Calibrating the appropriate mix of such loyalties across the
branches therefore presents a considerable, if unavoidable, array of challenges. To
that end, the Article offers a taxonomy of causal mechanisms by which institutional
loyalty can be generated within each of the three branches. Working branch by
branch, the Article identifies examples of institutional reforms capable of modifying
institutional loyalty in ways that could promote widely shared constitutional ends.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence
of three distinct and separate branches.1 Each was initially imagined to act “as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment
or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”2 In

1
See, for example, Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935)
(“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of
the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.”).
2
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). See also Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 860 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) (“In order to
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a famous passage in Federalist 51, James Madison amplified this
pivotal causal mechanism. “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition,” he explained, and “[t]he interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”3 In this key
passage, Madison invoked the institutional loyalty of officials—
their tendency to identify with and to act in ways that promote
their home institution—as a central dynamo of branch autonomy
and healthy interbranch friction. Relying on these loyalties, he
predicted that fractious interactions between branches fomented
by this institutional loyalty would, in net, enhance individual liberty.4 At the same time, Madison recognized that voters would at
times be driven by partisan, ideological, or even material “passions” that clouded their respect for these institutional boundaries.5 In these moments, he suggested, officials’ loyalty to their
home institutions would shelter valued institutional norms
against the fickle tides of popular sentiment.6
A recent wave of empirically informed and theoretically
sophisticated scholarship has challenged the significance of this
optimistic Madisonian equilibrium. This scholarship has powerfully questioned the Framers’ optimistic account of rivalrous
branches led by zealous empire builders. Particularly now that

prevent [ ] tyranny, the Framers devised a governmental structure composed of three distinct branches.”).
3
Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”).
4
See id at 348 (“[S]eparate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government . . . is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty.”). See also
Bond v United States, 564 US 211, 222 (2011) (“[S]eparation-of-powers principles . . . protect each branch of government from incursion by the others . . . [and] protect the individual.”); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated
powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty.”). For a similar recent statement
to the same effect, see National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550,
2559 (2014) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to safeguard
individual liberty.”).
5
Federalist 49 (Madison), in The Federalist 338, 343 (cited in note 3) (“The passions
. . . of the public, would sit in judgment. . . . [M]ere declarations in the written constitution,
are not sufficient to restrain the several departments. . . . [O]ccasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision, for that purpose.”).
6
See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110
Colum L Rev 479, 498 (2010) (lauding such separations as ways of enhancing legality and
rights); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2317 (2006).
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our two political parties are ideologically homogeneous, the modern position contends, our national political-party system has
“tied the power and political fortunes of government officials to
issues and elections” and thereby fostered “a set of incentives that
rendered these officials largely indifferent to the powers and interests of the branches per se.”7 They predict that officials will
have an “array” of interests, but rarely will these interests
“strongly correlate[ ] with increasing the scope or wealth of government institutions.”8 The result is that partisan and ideological
loyalty often eclipse institutional loyalty both as a practical and
as an analytic matter.9
The ascendancy of this important and insightful body of work
means that the idea of distinctively institutional loyalties receives short shrift in the constitutional-law literature. Attention
to the effects of intense partisan and ideological loyalties (which
we do not deny) have crowded out descriptive questions of why
institutional loyalties might persist and why they matter
(whether for good or ill) when they do persist, as well as the normative question of how to generate appropriate institutional loyalties when they are desirable.10 It is against this backdrop that

7
Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv L Rev 2311, 2323 (2006).
8
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv
L Rev 915, 920 (2005). See also Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States:
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1832 (2009)
(“Not all of the structural and political mechanisms Madison envisioned have worked in
the ways he anticipated or hoped.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 670 (2011) (“Madison
never explained why the branches of government, or the state and federal governments,
would reliably have political incentives at odds with one another—why they would tend to
compete rather than cooperate or collude.”). For endorsements of this view by other scholars, see Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U Pa J Const L 419, 430 (2015) (“[A] system intended to channel competition
through the political branches actually channels it through the political parties.”); Bruce
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv L Rev 1737, 1809 n 222 (2007) (describing
the parties-not-powers theory as a “breakthrough” and an “essential reference point”).
9
See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and
the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 443 (2012) (“[T]he Madisonian model of
interbranch rivalry is especially inaccurate during times of unified government.”); Levinson
and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2329 (cited in note 7) (“[W]hen government is unified and
the engine of party competition is removed from the internal structure of government, we
should expect interbranch competition to dissipate. Intraparty cooperation (as a strategy
of interparty competition) smoothes over branch boundaries and suppresses the central
dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model.”).
10 The scholars that have remained loyal to institutional loyalty are therefore often
left playing defense against the skeptical modern position that institutional loyalties are
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we aim to reevaluate institutional loyalty—the psychological cornerstone of a larger Madisonian political logic—as an object of
sustained analysis in constitutional scholarship. In the service of
that larger project, we advance here three points—one descriptive, one analytic, and finally a normative claim.
First, as a descriptive matter, we argue that the behavior of
federal officials cannot always be explained simply by partisan or
ideological motives. The current working of our constitutional
system evinces the lingering influence of institutional loyalty of
the kind Madison anticipated, particularly in the executive and
judicial contexts. Officials may variously support an increase or a
decrease in the power of their institution but often enough be motivated by a loyalty to the best interests of their institution. We
do not claim, to be clear, that such loyalties are the most important or consequential element of our constitutional system.
More modestly, we suggest that they persist to an extent that
warrants more careful theorizing. Our aim here is not to measure
their pervasiveness: it is to show that they operate at least occasionally in important policy consequence—and as such are worth
identifying, defining, and exploring in terms of the institutional
design of our constitutional system.
This descriptive claim can be illustrated with three examples,
each drawn from a different branch, in which officials’ behavior is
difficult to explain exclusively by partisan or ideological
motivations.
First, faced with a politically polarizing challenge in a presidential election year to President Barack Obama’s signature
healthcare legislation, Chief Justice John Roberts is alleged to

relics of our constitutional past. Compare Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers 28–35 (Yale 2017) (criticizing Levinson and
Pildes on the ground that “party discipline is by no means absolute in the American system”), with Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NYU L Rev 227, 227 (2016) (“[L]eading
accounts . . . fail to capture the multidimensional nature of administrative control in which
the constitutional branches (the old separation of powers) and the administrative rivals
(the new separation of powers) all compete with one another to influence administrative
governance.”). But see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U Pa L Rev 715, 715,
774 (2012) (“Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed
to seeing it exercise. . . . [A] possible explanation for congressional underutilization of its
powers is that members of Congress are largely unconcerned with congressional power;
their primary loyalty is to their party, not their branch.”). Our aim here is to systematize
these hints.

6
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have shifted his vote to support the legislation.11 Glossing his
switch, journalist Jan Crawford observed that the chief justice “is
keenly aware of his leadership role on the court, and he also is
sensitive to how the court is perceived by the public.”12 Standard
ideological or attitudinal models of judicial behavior do not offer
a straightforward explanation of his vote, or his alleged shift.13
While secure conclusions are difficult to reach, it is at least plausible to think that concern about the Court as an institution figured large in the chief justice’s reasoning.
Second, during the presidencies of George W. Bush and
Obama, many lawyers serving as cabinet officials and senior
political appointees resisted White House initiatives in favor of
positions motivated by allegiance to their agencies’ or offices’
legalistic institutional agenda. Attorney General John Ashcroft
and his deputy James Comey, for example, resisted White House
pressure to authorize a surveillance program they believed ultra
vires.14 Similarly, senior lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) and the Department of Defense resisted Obama’s 2011
military intervention in Libya on legalistic grounds, while State
Department and White House lawyers defended it.15
Despite the different administrations involved, these examples
involve officials resisting ideological or partisan ambitions on legalistic grounds when their home agency or department has an interest in maintaining a legal constraint on the presidential agenda.
Generalizing about these lawyers’ actions, former OLC lawyer
Jack Goldsmith has explained, “A political appointee is a temporary steward in the institution in which she works, and is often
moved to preserve the values and reputation of that institution,”
even at the cost of compromising an administration’s immediate

11 Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law (CBS News,
July 2, 2012), online at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched
-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/2/ (visited Oct 19, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
12 Id.
13 See Jan Crawford, Discord at Supreme Court Is Deep, and Personal (CBS News,
July 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4B7J-6WKG (noting that Roberts broke with
those who had assumed he would be an ideological ally).
14 See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 216–17 (2007) (statement of James B. Comey, former deputy
attorney general, Department of Justice).
15 See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate (NY
Times, June 17, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/73TJ-MDZY.
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policy goals.16 We take Goldsmith as a credible source for the
idea that officials believe themselves to be “stewards” of their
institution.
Third, over the course of the twentieth century, Congress has
created a number of durable institutional structures that are not
well explained in terms of the partisan or ideological interests of
members. Foremost among these is the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 194617 (LRA). This Act “vigorously reasserted congressional
oversight power over the Executive Branch, and it remains the
statutory basis for a great deal of contemporary oversight activity.”18 It reorganized the unwieldy congressional committee system, reducing the number of committees from forty-eight to
nineteen in the House and from thirty-three to fifteen in the
Senate.19 In addition, it defined committee jurisdictions in clear
and systematic ways that allowed legislators to specialize in the
oversight of specific elements of the executive.20 Congressional supervision of the administrative state of the kind familiar today
would simply not exist without the LRA. The leading historical accounts of the LRA’s legislative passage emphasize that Congress
intended to bolster its institutional capacity to act.21 More generally, Professor Eric Schickler’s study of every major institutional
design change within Congress over the past century found
“several major reforms,” including the LRA, were motivated in
important part by “Congress-centered interests” that were distinct and different from partisan or personal careerist interests
alone.22
The official action at stake in each of these three contexts was
not only materially significant, but also hard to explain in purely
partisan or ideological terms. Rather, in each case, a pivotal decisionmaker made a costly investment that advanced institutional

16 Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration (Lawfare, May
14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/H2NS-KDXX.
17 60 Stat 812.
18 Jonathan G. Pray, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of
the Oversight Power, 76 U Colo L Rev 297, 305 (2005).
19 Roger H. Davidson, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 15 Legis Stud Q 357, 365 (1990).
20 Id.
21 See id at 360. See also Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U Miami L Rev 1005, 1027 n 81 (1991) (“The Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946 formalized the oversight function of Congress.”).
22 Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress 8, 14 (Princeton 2001).
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interests in a way that was likely at odds with (or at least orthogonal to) the optimal pursuit of partisan or ideological goals.23
These actions are at least suggestive evidence of the continuing
salience of institutional loyalty across the federal government
(although it is quite telling that to find a legislative example, we
are forced to retreat some seventy years back in time). They do
not imply that institutional loyalty matters always, or even a
majority of the time. Rather, the examples suggest that on some
key policy questions, institutional loyalties can influence the
shape and nature of federal action.
With this descriptive claim in hand, our second, analytic contribution is to define with precision the potential mechanisms
through which “institutional loyalty” can operate. This analytic
project has several elements. To begin with, we define “institutional loyalty” to mean an individual official actor’s psychological
proclivity to perceive his or her proper course of behavior in terms
of, or as incorporating, what he or she perceives to be the best interests of his or her home institution, and to behave in accordance
with the interests of his or her home institution. This includes not
only loyalty to advance a branch’s interest in the separation-ofpowers context, but also positive loyalty toward agency- and
department-level interests. We then suggest that the Constitution
contains several mechanisms with the potential to generate institutional loyalty at the branch level. To establish a more complete
accounting of relevant mechanisms, we identify further examples
from the agency and legislative design contexts. These examples,
we readily concede, involve loyalties to a subbranch level—but
they are helpful to our analytic project nonetheless. The ensuing
taxonomy illuminates untapped options for recalibrating institutional loyalties, and thereby enabling institutional retrenchment
against potentially destabilizing partisan and ideological forces.
We hence conclude that the modern position is right to posit that
institutional loyalty does not emerge naturally or inevitably. We
resist, however, the unspoken (if fairly plain) implication of the

23 There are other examples in which institutional interests and partisan motives
clearly align. Consider, for example, the Senate’s refusal to hold hearings on Obama’s
Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick Garland. Carl Hulse, Supreme Court Showdown
Could Shape Fall Elections (NY Times, Mar 16, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/17/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-obama-congress.html (visited Oct 19,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable). We largely discard these examples because they do not
provide unambiguous evidence of institutional loyalty at work.
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modern position that our constitutional system is bereft of mechanisms to induce and reinforce such loyalties.24
To demonstrate the potential for institutional redesign, we
explore two distinct mechanisms that constitutional designers
can use to elicit, or tamp down on, institutional loyalties. First,
constitutional designers can manipulate the selection of officials
who populate branches in ways that render them more or less
likely to be institutionally minded. There are two relevant design
decisions with such “selection effects.”25 These are rules that govern entrance to a branch and rules concerning exit. Scholars have
previously explored selection rules’ use to promote a range of
other constitutional goals, such as democratic accountability,
transparency, and the minimization of democratic agency costs.26
But their underappreciated effect on institutional loyalty, we submit, rewards renewed attention.
Our second design margin hones in on the effect of organizational socialization on officials’ proclivity to align themselves with
an institutional mission.27 The three branches of the federal government are bordered by a “thick political surround” of internal
and external entities and interest groups.28 Against that backdrop, constitutional designers can advance or limit branch-level
incentives by fostering an institutional mandate that ousts
24 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2318 (cited in note 7) (“Madison’s willbased theory of separation of powers would seem to require government officials who care
more about the intrinsic interests of their departments than their personal interests or
the interests of the citizens they represent. Democratic politics is unlikely to generate such
officials.”).
25 Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 Va L Rev 953, 953
(2005) (using the term and noting that such effects flow from “the question of which
(potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over time”).
26 Constitutions are typically shaped by a range of goals, including the creation of
channels for peaceful political contestation, the enabling of public-good creation, the fostering of legitimacy (democratic or otherwise), and the minimizing of agency costs. See
Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance, in Tom Ginsburg
and Aziz Z. Huq, eds, Assessing Constitutional Performance 3, 14–23 (Cambridge 2016)
(setting out four criteria for the evaluation of a constitution’s success: legitimacy, channeling political conflict, limiting agency costs, and creating public goods). The same sort of
ends-related pluralism characterizes the separation of powers. See Aziz Z. Huq and Jon
D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L J 346, 382–
91 (2016).
27 See Daniel Carpenter and George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics, 25 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 5, 13 (2014) (discussing the relationship
between organizational socialization and institutional loyalty). See also John Brehm and
Scott Gates, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic
Public 3 (Michigan 1999) (summarizing historical research that shows the influence of “a
bureaucrat’s own preferences, peers, supervisors, and clients” on work decisions).
28 Huq and Michaels, 126 Yale L J at 391 (cited in note 26).
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attachments to competing elements of the thick political surround, and thereby provides a crisper focal point for institutional
loyalty. We explore the ways in which a constitutional designer
(or a legislator) can “slice up” institutions of government in order
to induce beliefs in a mandate. Alternatively, designers can harness, or even create, social networks to strengthen or undermine
institutional loyalty. These networks, which emerge within and
also cut across branches, are often ignored because of their informal, unstructured operation. But they too importantly promote
(or undermine) ideological and partisan interests that compete
with institutional loyalty.
Finally, in addition to these descriptive and analytic points,
we aim to make a distinct normative contribution. We argue that
constitutional designers usefully take account of institutional loyalty as part of their efforts to craft a desirable separation of
powers. In our view, institutional loyalties are not in and of themselves intrinsically desirable ends. Rather, they play a foundational role in sometimes helping, and sometimes hindering, the
realization of otherwise normatively desirable constitutional
ends.
Nevertheless, because institutional loyalties can play a pivotal role in shaping how structural constitutional law operates at
times, the situations in which these loyalties promote desirable
constitutional goals ought to be considered and embraced. In contrast, when loyalties undermine those goals, they should be
avoided. So the task of the institutional designer is complex: it is
to calibrate the appropriate mix of such loyalties across the
branches by estimating when they will advance needful constitutional ends, and when they will retard them. Of necessity, this
task requires some estimation and informed prediction. It is not
one that can be executed with mathematical precision given the
vagaries of national political life. But this does not distinguish it
from most other elements of constitutional and institutional
design, which must be accomplished in the teeth of substantial
uncertainty about the future.
Our reckoning of institutional loyalties, in sum, is more
nuanced than Madison’s. Consistent with this subtler approach,
we aim here to identify conditions under which institutional
loyalty might motivate constitutional compliance, counteract
disabling partisan polarization, and dampen the agency costs of
representative democracy. We think that institutional loyalty
should be cultivated to these ends. On the other hand, we flag
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instances in which such loyalty undermines the rule of law,
thwarts the vindication of constitutional rights, and destabilizes
the deliberative, polyarchic29 form of governance sought by the
Framers. Not surprisingly, we think institutional loyalty in the
latter cases should be titrated with greater caution.
In terms of specific reforms, our suggestions are branch specific. We think that useful institutional reform efforts focus now
on increasing institutional loyalty within the legislature while
diminishing it within the judiciary. The executive branch
presents a subtler question. In some contexts, the executive is
powerfully motivated by institutional loyalty in ways that redound to the public good. This may be especially so when elected
actors press agendas that are directly disruptive of longstanding
democratic or institutional practice. But in other regards, there is
a case for diluting their effects in ways that protect the rule of law
from potentially corrupting and distorting influences.
Our focus on these interbranch relations means we must
sideline the related but distinct question of federalism as a
cockpit in which institutional loyalty also plays a potentially
salient function. The question whether state officials advance the
institutional interests of states when lobbying Congress,30 participating in cooperative federalism programs,31 contributing to
administrative agency rulemaking,32 or advancing structural constitutional arguments in the Supreme Court33 is an important and

29 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition 8 (Yale 1971)
(“[P]olyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that
is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.”).
30 See Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?,
66 Stan L Rev 217, 280–88 (2014) (analyzing difficulties states’ officials have in advancing
state interests in Congress, and suggesting generalizations about when that might occur).
31 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 BC L Rev 1, 31 (2011) (“State and federal
actors also negotiate over enforcement policy and individual enforcement actions arising
within cooperative federalism programs.”).
32 See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100
Va L Rev 953, 961, 970 (2014) (arguing that “state interest groups’ advocacy efforts were
initiated to create a voice for states qua states—a voice for the institutional interests of
state governments rather than the varied political preferences of state constituents or individual state officials”—and noting that “[t]o the extent federal law has directed agencies
to engage states in federal decision making, it has done so largely by giving state interest
groups a central role”).
33 See, for example, Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida, South
Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Alabama, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Washington,
Idaho, South Dakota, Indiana, North Dakota, Mississippi, Arizona, Nevada, Georgia,
Alaska, Ohio, Kansas, Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Maine; Schuette; Branstad v United
States Department of Health and Human Services, Docket No 11-400, *11 (US filed Mar
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fascinating one. We hope our analysis shows the utility of an
institutional loyalty–focused framing. Perhaps this lens is especially useful at a time when not merely individual fidelities to
institutions, but even the stable and predictable operation of
national institutions themselves, appear to be subject to pressure
of sorts from populist political movements on all sides seeking to
disrupt the institutional status quo.34
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the conceptual
groundwork by defining and historicizing the concept of institutional loyalty. We demonstrate the past and present importance
of institutional loyalty as both a complement to and substitute for
other mechanisms to safeguard the separation of powers. Part II
then introduces a typology of four mechanisms whereby institutional loyalty can be cultivated. For each pathway, we carefully
examine necessary assumptions and prerequisites. In Part III,
working across all three branches, we consider the extent to
which institutional loyalty can be identified at work in each of the
three branches. We further adduce suggested reforms for
strengthening or rechanneling institutional loyalty based on the
insights gained through Part II’s typology.
I. INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTIES (AND THEIR CRITICS)
We begin our analysis by clarifying the idea of institutional
loyalty. We first offer a definition of the concept. We then trace its
historical and contemporary importance to constitutional law.
While the idea has deep roots and foundational importance to
constitutional law, prevailing legal scholarship is largely hostile
to the concept. We then develop a range of motivating examples
to demonstrate the continued prevalence of institutional loyalty.
A.

Defining Institutional Loyalties

An institutional loyalty is an individual official actor’s psychological proclivity to perceive his or her proper course of behavior in terms of, or as incorporating, what he or she perceives to be
the best interests of his or her home institution, and to behave in
12, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 864598) (challenging the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that states expand their Medicaid programs as unconstitutionally coercive).
34 For more extended consideration of the interaction of populism with constitutional
democracy in the US context, see Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional
Democracy, 65 UCLA L Rev *19 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/XB4S
-8ZAH; Aziz Z. Huq, Book Review, The People against the Constitution, 116 Mich L Rev *5
(forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/V5EQ-9ZMP.
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accordance with the interests of his or her home institution. To
have an institutional loyalty is thus to maintain a stable conception of how best an institution’s mandate—the core purposes or
functions it aims to achieve—can be promoted and to act in accordance with that conception. Competing loyalties and interests
arise, of course, but loyalty to the institution helps ensure that
behavior consistent with the interests of the institution persists
in the face of this competition.
While the idea of an institutional loyalty has fallen out of current constitutional jurisprudence, it is a familiar one from our
daily lives. Most of us belong to a team, a religious or civic institution, or an organized association (or even a law school). We
necessarily decide when and whether to align our individual sentiments with the apparent needs of the institutions with which
we affiliate. Within such institutional contexts, it is common to
observe that some individuals identify and behave more consistently with the institution’s shared interests, while others hew to
a more narrowly defined, individual conception of self-interest.
Given the pervasiveness and obvious salience of such loyalties in
ordinary life, we think it is at least worth asking whether analogs
exist in public law.
Institutional loyalty is also familiar to scholars outside of constitutional law. Within the rational-choice tradition, institutional
allegiances are evaluated in terms of the costs and benefits to individuals of participation in a group. The central collective-action
problem that interest groups face, most famously identified by
Professor Mancur Olson, turns on the incentives that individuals
face to act in their own interests and thereby free ride on and
undermine their institution.35 Following Olsen, public-choice
scholars have written extensively about the conditions in which
institutional loyalties arise and overcome individual incentives to
free ride.36 But in so doing, political scientists have departed
somewhat from the standard motivational premises of rationalchoice theory. Some, in a tenor that is relevant to our project here,
have contended that institutions are often constructed to have
35 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 165–67 (Harvard 1971) (stating that large institutions face difficulties in convincing individual members to act in the collective institutional interest).
36 The empirical literature refuting or at least complicating Olson’s simplified claim
is extensive. For a few of the best summaries of this literature, see Ernst Fehr and Simon
Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J Econ Persp 159,
162–63 (Summer 2000); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community
Policing, 90 Cal L Rev 1513, 1516 (2002).
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“purposes” and be “carriers of ideas,” such that their “norms and
values affect their members” to act on behalf of their institutions.37
An institutional loyalty rests, whether explicitly or implicitly,
on a contestable judgment about how to conceptualize a branch’s
best interests. The right way to be loyal, say to Congress or the
executive, cannot be identified mechanically ex ante. Institutional loyalists may therefore disagree about the precise demands
imposed by their fidelity. That said, we think that institutional
loyalty is often characterized by long time horizons. Given the
durability of the branches, their interests are more likely to be
understood in a longer rather than a shorter time frame. In
contrast, the ideological and partisan loyalty identified by the
modern position may evince a wider variety of time horizons,
ranging from brief to long.
Institutional loyalty might also exist in two subtly different
forms, but both yield similar behavioral effects. First, an individual official can perceive an institution’s interests as her interests:
there is no gap between individual sentiment and institutional
loyalty. An institutional loyalty, in other words, can be sincere.38
Alternatively, an individual official might disagree in whole or in
part with the institution’s goals, but nonetheless decide to treat
the institution’s interests as her own. She might do so for strategic
reasons (for example, career advancement) or out of a sense of role
morality.39 For the purposes of our analysis, we largely lump
together sincere and strategic forms of allegiance.

37 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development 82–83 (Cambridge 2004). Our reading of the rational-choice tradition in legal
scholarship is that there is a focus generally on individual costs and benefits, although
sophisticated theorists are clear that they understand individuals to have other preferences and values. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics:
Essays in Reform and Recollection 136–41 (Yale 2016) (describing this phenomenon and
noting in particular that “economists have sometimes ignored the desire for altruism and
beneficence that in fact many people have”). We aim here to take one subset of such goals
and values seriously on their own terms.
38 See, for example, Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987, 992
(2008) (defining sincerity in a similar context as “correspondence between what people
say, what they intend to say, and what they believe”).
39 See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public
and Professional Life 63 (Princeton 1999) (describing role morality as the “particular moral
reasons for action that others, outside the [institutional] role, do not face”); W. Bradley
Wendel, Book Review, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 Georgetown L J 667, 673
(2001) (discussing role morality in terms of “the power of roles to permit an agent to deliberate on the basis of a restricted set of reasons—leaving out, for example, considerations
of harm to third parties”).
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Institutional loyalty is not necessarily identical to what
Professor Daryl Levinson has called “empire-building government.”40 Consider again our threshold examples concerning Chief
Justice Roberts and the executive-branch lawyers in OLC.41 In
both, there is evidence that institutional loyalty was at work and
that loyalty yielded careful thought about how best to advance an
institution’s interests. Both Roberts and the executive-branch
lawyers advanced an institutional agenda by trimming their
home institution’s powers. To Roberts, it was (arguably) obvious
that avoiding some divisive rulings would bolster the Article III
judiciary’s reputation. To the executive-branch lawyers, it was obvious that their home department would be strengthened in the
long term by advancing more limited legal claims (and hence
perhaps a means of credible commitment that would reduce
congressional resistance to delegation and judicial skepticism of
executive action).
On both points, Roberts and the lawyers might have been
wrong as a matter of fact: their chosen actions might have weakened their respective branches in unforeseen ways. Or they might
have been wrong as a normative matter: the “best” way for an
institution—be it a branch, a business, a family, or a nation—to
prosper is rarely beyond dispute. But the complexity and nuance
of their judgments suggest that what we call institutional loyalty
need not be “empire-building” in character.42
B.

Historicizing Institutional Loyalties

Institutional autonomy is an important goal of American
constitutional design. Democratic control over institutions has
long been an important mechanism to generate this autonomy.
Democratic control, though, can often be insufficient to protect institutions. From the Framers’ vantage point, ensuring that those
working for institutions are loyal to these institutions was an
important complement to democratic control and a necessary
foundation for institutional autonomy.
The idea of institutional loyalty enters American constitutional law in James Madison’s account of the separation of powers

40 Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at 917 (cited in note 8) (defining “empire-building” as
governmental behavior that seeks to maximize power and/or wealth “at the expense of
competing government bodies—and, ultimately, at the expense of the citizenry”).
41 See text accompanying notes 11–16.
42 See Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at 928 (cited in note 8).
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in Federalist 51.43 The question of what would preserve institutional boundaries between the three branches was pressed
actively in the constitutional ratification debates. Antifederalist
critics of the 1787 Constitution were alarmed by what they perceived as deficiencies in the Constitution’s separations between
powers.44 Many, such as the pseudonymous Pennsylvania Officer
in the Late Continental Army, worried that the 1787 proposal had
simply “not kept separate” different governmental powers.45 A
related concern was that institutional barriers would not prove
stable. The Philadelphia-based Antifederalist Centinel, for example, doubted the viability of “three balancing powers [that is,
branches], whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium
of interests.”46
The most celebrated response to these arguments is found in
a series of essays, beginning with Federalist 47, in which Madison,
writing pseudonymously as Publius, defended the proposed
“constitutional equilibrium” between the three branches.47 Madison
argued that “dependence on the people” would be the “primary
controul on the government.”48 Madison turned to Thomas
Jefferson’s proposal of popular enforcement of separation-of-powers
constraints via periodic constitutional conventions tasked with
resolving interbranch contentions.49
But such popular control, Madison explained, would be inadequate for several reasons. To begin with, frequent conventions
would imply “defect[s]” in government, sapping the “veneration,
43

Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 54 (Chicago 1981).
45 Id at 60 (quoting an Antifederalist tract by the “Officer of the Late Continental
Army”). See also Cecilia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature
of Representative Government, 12 Wm & Mary Q 3, 23 (1955) (describing the Antifederalists’
demand for a “more rigid” separation of powers).
46 Centinel, To the Freemen of Pennsylvania, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist, 136, 138 (Chicago 1981). See also Kenyon, 12 Wm & Mary Q at 23
(cited in note 45) (discussing Antifederalist demand for “more effective checks and
balances”).
47 Federalist 49 at 341 (cited in note 5). Because our analysis is an effort to clarify
the argument offered by Madison, we do not offer any larger claim about belief in institutional loyalty among the Founding generation.
48 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
49 Federalist 49 at 338–39 (cited in note 5) (quotation marks omitted):
44

One of the precautions . . . as a palladium to the weaker departments of power,
against the invasions of the stronger, is . . . that whenever any two of the three
branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds
of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose.
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which time bestows on every thing.”50 Madison also worried that
partisan “passions” would cloud popular judgment about the
importance of institutional boundaries.51 Even when popular
judgment recognized these boundaries’ value, the people might be
handicapped because they lacked information about what their
agents were doing.52 To be sure, Madison thought that the government’s relationship with the people “ought to be marked out,
and kept open,”53 but he also knew that the aspiration toward
transparency would on occasion be thwarted.54
These concerns were grave enough, Madison thought, to
make a “necessity of auxiliary precautions.”55 If “better motives”56
protecting institutional boundaries would not always be found
among the people, they could be supplied via the mechanism of
institutional loyalty. Federalist 51 introduces the concept in a
famous passage:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place. . . . This policy of supplying by opposite and rival
interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as
public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate
distributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every
individual, may be a centinel over the public rights.57
Madison’s argument has several elements, which can be
usefully disaggregated: (1) the alignment between officials’ and
offices’ interests (which we label institutional loyalty) (2) that will
be “opposite and rival” to each other (3) so as to shield public
rights and stabilize a “constitutional equilibrium.” We are interested here in the first element. This element, we note, is conceptually distinct from the other pieces of Madison’s argument.
50

Id at 340.
Id at 342–43.
52 For a helpful discussion of this problem of institutional clarity in constitutional
design, see G. Bingham Powell Jr, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian
and Proportional Visions 61–64 (Yale 2000).
53 Federalist 49 at 339 (cited in note 5).
54 Id at 339–40 (noting that the direct appeal to the people would not always be a
means of resolving conflict).
55 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
56 Id.
57 Id.
51
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In Madison’s account, institutional loyalty plays the part that
“self-love” has in Adam Smith’s famous economic theory, a private
vice that can be set in dynamic interaction against itself to
promote the public good.58 Institutional loyalties lead officials to
“resist encroachments of the other[ ]” branches.59 Official loyalty
to one’s institution means that their resistance does not fluctuate
along with popular “passions.”60 In this sense, institutional loyalty complements democratic control as a mechanism to protect
branch-level boundaries, especially at moments when passions
sweep the populace.
Madison limns three paths by which this mechanism has an
effect. First, institutions can operate as “a check on [each] other.”61
If the executive branch is generating “encroachments” on Congress,
for example, officials loyal to the legislative branch expend time
and effort to “resist” the executive.62 Second, Madison also
thought a third party (such as a federal court, or perhaps the
several states) might identify and “resist encroachments.”63 The
legislative branch can resist the executive branch by initiating or
organizing challenges to the executive branch in federal court, for
instance. Third, those within an institution have a comparative
advantage in identifying and resisting encroachments on their
authority.64
58 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
16 (Chicago 1976) (Edwin Cannan, ed) (originally published 1776):

But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in
vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is
for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.
For Madison’s reading of Smith, see Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception among
the American Founders, 1776–1790, 59 Wm & Mary Q 897, 905–15 (2002); David Prindle,
The Invisible Hand of James Madison, 15 Const Polit Economy 223, 231–34 (2004).
59 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
60 Federalist 49 at 343 (cited in note 5) (“The passions ought to be controuled and
regulated by the government.”).
61 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
62 Id.
63 Id at 349, 351.
64 Id at 349. As an aside, we think Madison missed a complication here: if officials
change course only when another institution resists, their reliance on others’ policing
efforts might crowd out any internalization of the Constitution’s structural norms. See
Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ J 1043,
1044–45 (1997). See also Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U
Chi L Rev 421, 424 (2003) (“[T]he self-interest assumption may crowd out public-spirited
motivations.”). The possibility of a feedback effect of this sort suggests a need to consider
how the design of interbranch interactions dynamically influences the incentives and
beliefs of those within the branches.
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Writing as Publius, Madison and Alexander Hamilton both
expressed their expectation that institutional loyalties would generate good government. Addressing the Senate’s willingness to
punish executive-branch wrongdoing through the impeachment
process, Hamilton in Federalist 66 hence avers to that chamber’s
“pride, if not . . . [its] virtue,” as a spring of action.65 And, discussing relations between the national government and the several
states, Madison hypothesized “motives on the part of the State
governments, to augment their prerogatives,” and conjectured
that even officials elected to federal office would have “prepossessions . . . generally . . . favorable to the States.”66 These proinstitutional inclinations, he suggested, would be so strong that
even if the national government had “an equal disposition with
the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits,”
the latter were likely to “have the advantage.”67
There is also a trace of an institutional loyalty–based argument
in Hamilton’s defense of the federal judiciary in Federalist 78.68 On
Hamilton’s account, members of the federal judiciary would be
steeped in a dense network of “strict rules and precedents,” which
require hard study to master.69 Judges’ behavior, Hamilton argued,
would be oriented and shaped by organizational socialization on
the branch. By analogy to then-contemporary models of human
psychology, Hamilton seems to have supposed that the legalistic
loyalty inculcated in Article III judges would orient the federal
bench toward acting as the “conscience” of the federal government.70 It requires only a small step to hypothesize on this basis
that judges’ guild loyalty will lead them to value and protect their
branch’s distinctive institutional culture and role.
In developing this Madisonian vision, we think it is
important to observe that institutional loyalty, while a crucial
design dimension of constitutional law, is also a normatively complicated one. Institutional loyalty is not identical to constitutional
loyalty. An institution’s best interests can be served by behaviors
not contemplated or allowed by constitutional law. Moreover, the
boundaries of an institution are already sufficiently robust that

65

Federalist 66 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 445, 451 (cited in note 3).
Federalist 46 (Madison), in The Federalist, 315, 317–19 (cited in note 3).
67 Id at 319.
68 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 526–30 (cited in note 3).
69 Id at 529.
70 Daniel W. Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist, 44 Wm & Mary Q 485,
500 (1987).
66
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officials’ zeal and loyalty can disserve the stability of the constitutional system.
But this gap between institutional and constitutional loyalty
is left largely unaddressed by Madison and his contemporaries.
The Federalist Papers separately address institutional loyalty (in
places like Federalist 51) and constitutional loyalty. Hamilton,
for instance, defended the Electoral College in Federalist 68 as a
means of ensuring loyalty to constitutional principle given its tendency to select for “characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue,”
and not only those with a talent for “the little arts of popularity.”71
He did not connect this theory (however sound it might be in practice) to his accounts of institutional loyalties, or to the Madisonian
vision of ambition checking ambition. Nor does Publius ever
explain why a national representative process that generates
officials inclined to pursue “the common good of the society”72
would also throw up institutionally disposed officials. In short,
even when reconstructed with a friendly eye, the Madisonian
account of institutional loyalties is characterized by gaps and discontinuities with the balance of Publius’s theory of constitutional
design.
This institutional loyalty understanding of official motivation
has not fallen completely out of the jurisprudence. In construing
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act73 in National Labor Relations
Board v SW General, Inc,74 for example, Roberts explained
Congress’s decision to alter that statutory scheme in 1998 as
motivated by a “[p]erceiv[ed] threat to the Senate’s advice and
consent power.”75 At least in the Court’s view, therefore, it is still
sensible to gloss congressional action in terms of the durable
institutional prerogatives and powers of Article I institutions. In
a similar vein, the District of Columbia courts have recognized
that when Congress as “[an] institution [ ] files suit, it can obtain
a remedy for the ‘institutional’ injury.”76 The recognition for
71

Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 457, 460–61 (cited in note 3).
Federalist 57 (Madison), in The Federalist 384, 384 (cited in note 3).
73 Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (1998), codified at 5 USC § 3345 et seq.
74 137 S Ct 929 (2017).
75 Id at 936.
76 United States House of Representatives v Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d 53, 72 (DDC
2015) (authorizing suit by the House to challenge violations of the Appropriations Clause),
quoting Kucinich v Bush, 236 F Supp 2d 1, 7 (DDC 2002). The Supreme Court has recognized an analog institutional interest in state legislatures. See Arizona State Legislature
v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S Ct 2652, 2664 (2015) (authorizing
a challenge under Article I to an independent redistricting commission on the ground that
“[t]he Arizona Legislature . . . is an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury”).
72
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Article III standing purposes of a legislature’s ability to vindicate
“institutional” interests by seeking injunctive or declaratory relief
is a formal legal recognition of the idea that the officials within
one of the three branches can and do act on the basis of institutional, rather than ideological or partisan, grounds.77
C.

Questioning Institutional Loyalties

Current legal scholarship tells a different story about institutional loyalties. Leading voices in law reviews appear to be
skeptical that institutional loyalties even exist and are skeptical
of the notion that they might be sufficiently reliable and regular
to explain institutional behavior.78 In consequence, such motivations do not play a large role in current constitutional scholarship
on the separation of powers. To be clear, few scholars reject the
bare possibility of an institutional loyalty. It is rather that the
latter concept plays a relatively marginal role in their accounts.
This is complemented by an embrace of an alternative strain of
fidelities—partisan and ideological, in the main—that are cast as
more acutely motivating than institutional loyalty. Behavior
might be consistent with institutional loyalty, on this view, but is
never caused by it. We term this skeptical approach the “modern
position” on institutional loyalty. We set forth this skeptical story
in general terms, and then consider its roots. This serves as a
prelude to Parts II and III, and it suggests that institutional
loyalty not only exists but can be analyzed in parsimonious and
rigorous terms as part of constitutional law. To be clear, while we
admire much of the scholarship that the modern position comprises, and find much to praise in it, we think its most ambitious
variants sweep too far. We offer a modest course correction here—
a measure of supplemental theorizing of a term that can otherwise
easily drop out of institutional analysis.

77 Of course, the actual decision to initiate a lawsuit may be better explained on
partisan grounds. See text accompanying notes 145–46.
78 Part of the reaction of modern scholars to institutional loyalty is to question
whether there has ever been a clearly articulated theoretical account of the mechanisms—
if any—that lead to institutional loyalty. See, for example, Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv
L Rev at 2317 (cited in note 7) (“[I]t has never been clear exactly how the Madisonian
machine [of competitive branches] was supposed to operate.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, The
Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va L Rev 1127, 1158 (2000) (“Just how
tension and competition [between the branches] are created and maintained is never
clearly spelled out by courts or commentators.”). The modern position has been to criticize
the absence of mechanisms for institutional loyalty just as much as the accuracy of any
mechanisms that could be offered.
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The modern position is based on three interrelated descriptive claims about other affiliations that crowd out institutional
loyalties. First, some scholars argue that partisan loyalties
dominate and lead officials to act inconsistently with institutional
interests.79 Officials rely on parties to win elections for Congress
or the White House and to secure political appointments to the
executive branch and the federal bench; they subsequently maintain their fealty to their partisan patrons.80 Officials also rely on
parties to exercise significant powers while in office and pursue
partisan agendas when interacting with other governmental bodies.81 As a result of these observed regularities, “realist claims
about legal indeterminancy [sic] and the relation of law and politics are widely accepted in the academy.”82 To those who subscribe
to the overwhelming power of partisan loyalty, it is a historical
irony that Madison and his contemporaries (many of whom would
go on to create national parties) did not realize that political parties would exist and would generate such powerful incentives that
can in practice counteract institutional loyalty.83
Second, other scholars contend that ideological allegiances
conflict with and overwhelm institutional loyalties. An official’s
underlying sentiment about policy motivates their behavior, even

79 See, for example, Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2323 (cited in note 7)
(“[E]lectoral and policy interests of politicians have become intimately connected to political parties.”). See also Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 Va L Rev 301, 330–31
(2010) (“Individuals have party loyalties and personal interests, however, which may systematically diverge from institutional interests.”).
80 See, for example, Neal Devins and David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 BU L Rev 459, 490 (2008)
(noting that cross-party commission appointees are loyal to their party, not the president
who appointed them).
81 See, for example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America,
102 Va L Rev 953, 975 (2016) (“The partisan genealogy of executive federalism . . . is striking . . . . [The] national party system generates ties among state and federal actors.”). See
also generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv L Rev 1077 (2014)
(exploring how partisanship has transformed federalism and interactions between governments). For other scholarship that discusses the dynamic between partisan and institutional motives, see, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional
Showdowns, 156 U Pa L Rev 991, 1036 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball,
37 John Marshall L Rev 523, 529–30 (2004).
82 Alice Ristroph, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, 25 Const
Commen 431, 434 (2009).
83 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson,
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 16–26 (Harvard 2005); Bruce Ackerman
and David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 Va L Rev
551, 557–67 (2004).
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when in conflict with institutional interests.84 This assumption
dominates political science models of judicial behavior.85 It is
commonplace in that literature to assert that “the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of . . . the ideological attitudes and values
of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist vote[d] the way he [did]
because he [was] extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way
he did because he [was] extremely liberal.”86 While measures of
ideology have become more nuanced of late, many hew to the belief that the ideological loyalties of the justices motivate decisions,
not their loyalty toward the Court qua institution. Building on
this attitudinal model, positive political theorists have observed
that even ideologically motivated judges must account for the
likely strategic responses to their interventions and tailor their
actions accordingly.87 While such models yield more nuanced
predictions, they are characterized by the same a priori marginalization of institutional loyalty.88
Ideological loyalty is correlated with, but not identical to, partisan loyalty. Being motivated by a belief about what furthers a
policy goal is different from being motivated by a belief about
what serves a political organization. But presidents of one party
sometimes, either on purpose89 or as an unintentional side effect
84 The precise form of ideology generating the ideological loyalty can be disputed.
The various forms of ideological loyalty all return to some comprehensive worldview regarding the proper behavior of government motivating official behaviors. See David Fontana
and Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a National
Experiment, 112 Colum L Rev 731, 749–51 (2012).
85 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L
Rev 831, 836 & n 22 (2008) (“To date, the question that has received the most attention
from the New Legal Realists is the influence of a judge’s political ideology or attitudes.”).
86 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 65 (Cambridge 1993). This is the classic statement of attitudinalism, one that has
been modified and expanded over the past generation. An exception to this view is Judge
Richard Posner’s influential 1993 article, which emphasizes leisure and income but not
ideological “power trip[s].” Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ Rev 1, 3, 31 (1993). Neither in this
nor in later work does Posner underscore institutional loyalty.
87 See, for example, McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S Cal L Rev 1631, 1634 (1995) (arguing that accounting
for strategic context yields “a better understanding of when and how partisan politics will
affect judicial doctrine”).
88 Id at 1637 (stipulating that judges have exogenously given preferences over policy). See also Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions,
6 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 341, 343 (2010) (“Strategic accounts, in contrast, belong to a class
of nonparametric rational-choice models, as they assume that goal-directed actors—
including judges—operate in a strategic or interdependent decision-making context.”).
89 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865,
900–02 (2007).
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of another goal, nominate an official with a differing ideological
perspective, in some instances “using the agent’s known enmity
to the principal’s benefit.”90 For example, presidents might nominate judges with different ideological preferences from their own
as a way of credibly signaling the judges’ competence, or alternatively in order to impose costs on the partisan opposition.
President Obama’s 2016 nomination of the eminent moderate
jurist Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, we think, has this
flavor. At other instances, partisan affiliation may simply be a
bad proxy for ideological preferences. Famously, President
Dwight Eisenhower nominated both Justice William Brennan (a
Democrat) and Chief Justice Earl Warren (a Republican) to the
Supreme Court.91 He later expressed regret about both because of
their liberal tilt.92 All that said, we note that the two major political parties have become increasingly ideologically homogeneous
and polarized as party and ideology have become more strongly
correlated.93
In addition, it is worth noting that it is quite possible for a
partisan or an ideological loyalty to bleed into an institutional
loyalty. An ideological commitment to certain policy goals may
conduce to a belief in the primacy of one particular branch; for
instance, a strong concern with national security might conduce
to a preference for executive-branch primacy.94 In such instances,
the line between ideological and institutional loyalties may be

90 Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 Colum L Rev
2193, 2196 (2012).
91 Dwight D. Eisenhower, President’s News Conference (American Presidency Project,
Sept 30, 1953), archived at http://perma.cc/NJ82-8QKR. Some commentators argue that
the Warren appointment was the result of a political deal. See Ed Lazarus, The Truth
about Justices (Time, May 26, 2009), online at http://content.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,1900851_1900850_1900845,00.html (visited Oct 19, 2017)
(Perma archive unavailable).
92 Bernard Schwartz and Stephan Lesher, Inside the Warren Court: 1953–1969 92
(Doubleday 1983) (noting that Eisenhower called the Warren appointment the “biggest
damn-fool mistake I ever made”).
93 In past decades, ideological loyalty and partisan loyalty have increasingly overlapped because of sorting by ideologically homogenous political parties. For empirical evidence, see Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War?: The
Myth of a Polarized America 61–63, 78 (Pearson 3d ed 2011); Matthew Levendusky, The
Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans
126–28, 133 (Chicago 2009).
94 One of us, however, has argued that the association of executive-branch primacy
and national security success is premised on erroneous factual premises. Aziz Z. Huq,
Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev 887, 906–09 (2012)
(describing parochial interests of security agencies like the CIA).
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blurred. But the existence of ambiguous cases at the margin does
not rob these categories of their utility as a general matter.
Third, the modern position argues that personal, materialistic loyalties conflict with and overwhelm institutional loyalties.95
A loyalty to maximize power (in current office or by seeking a
higher one) could conflict with institutional loyalty. A desire for
the immediate or longitudinal acquisition of wealth could also
conflict with institutional loyalty. The federal criminal offense of
honest services fraud, which penalizes naked self-dealing in the
performance of “official act[s],”96 is one mechanism for mitigating
such conflicts. The recent Supreme Court decision in McDonnell
v United States97 narrowly construed that prohibition, effectively
allowing personal pecuniary interests greater leeway to displace
both ideological and institutional concerns.98
The modern position supplements these arguments by insisting on the impossibility of defining institutional powers. Madison
might have been a theorist of institutional loyalty, but he
famously wrote that “no skill in the science of government has yet
been able to . . . define, with sufficient certainty, [government’s]
three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.”99
Legal scholars have likewise argued that defining what it would
mean to protect “Congress” is a difficult enterprise.100 Absent a
cogent account of institutional perimeters, it is assumed, there is
no way to maintain a loyalty toward an institution.
Legal scholars articulating the modern position hence construct an account of governmental behavior in which there is
scant space for institutional loyalty. When a president disagrees
with large numbers of his partisan or ideological allies in the
Congress, scholars are not only reluctant to ascribe this to a
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See, for example, Posner, 3 S Ct Econ Rev at 31 (cited in note 86).
United States v Kemp, 500 F3d 257, 279–81 (3d Cir 2007) (holding that bribery in
the honest services context requires “a specific intent to give or receive something of value
in exchange for an official act”) (emphasis omitted), citing United States v Sun-Diamond
Growers of California, 526 US 398, 404–05 (1999).
97 136 S Ct 2355 (2016).
98 Id at 2364–65 (construing narrowly the honest services statute in politicalcorruption cases).
99 Federalist 37 (Madison), in The Federalist 231, 235 (cited in note 3).
100 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J 1725, 1735–36
(1996); Magill, 86 Va L Rev at 1158 (cited in note 78); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical
Separation of Powers, 49 Duke L J 749, 754 & n 21 (1999). See also Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev 1231, 1238 n 45 (1994) (“The problem
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favorable loyalty toward the executive branch but instead offer
the alternative explanation that it could “reflect[ ] the divergent
preferences of the different temporal and geographical majorities
that the House, Senate, and President represent (as opposed to
the institutional interests of the branches as such).”101 Scholars
writing about the persistence and predictability of institutional
loyalties are therefore left playing defense, having to discount
possible alternative loyalties that could explain a behavior that
appears to be based on an institutional loyalty.
Official claims on behalf of institutional interests may also be
discounted as a form of “cheap talk.” The modern position is that
such claims are ex post rationalizations, not ex ante loyalty. Publicly asserting an alternative loyalty—instead of an institutional
one—would be politically disastrous.102 For example, consider the
congressional reaction to the equally divided Supreme Court’s
affirmance of the Fifth Circuit’s decision that had earlier invalidated Obama’s immigration deferred-action programs,103 which
included Republican Speaker Paul Ryan issuing a widely noted
statement proclaiming his institutional loyalty. Ryan said that he
supported the lawsuit to ensure that “Article I of the Constitution
was vindicated” and that this success was a “major victory in our
fight to restore the separation of powers.”104 The modern position
is that Ryan talked a good institutional game but had a distinct
and different underlying loyalty. As one of the major national
leaders of the Republican Party, his partisan loyalty led him to
challenge the actions of a president of the other party. As an
ideologically conservative elected official, he did not believe in
creating a legal status for undocumented immigrants. As an
ambitious young politician, placing himself in front of a major national issue promised more power and prominence. Taking Ryan
as a model actor in the constitutional system, it is a short step to
a general rejection of the possibility of an institutional loyalty.
In short, the modern view of the motivations of institutional
actors within our separation of powers leaves little space for
institutional loyalties, even if it does not reject as a categorical
101

Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2324 (cited in note 7).
For empirical evidence that the public is convinced by public-regarding explanations, such as institutional loyalty, rather than appeals to narrow and personal selfinterest, see Eitan D. Hersh and Brian F. Schaffner, Targeted Campaign Appeals and the
Value of Ambiguity, 75 J Polit 520, 532 (2013).
103 See United States v Texas, 136 S Ct 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
104 Speaker Ryan on United States v. Texas Decision (Speaker Ryan Press Office, June
23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/N2J7-563P.
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matter the possibility of such fidelities. It is this lacuna in the
literature that we aim to explore here.
D. Identifying Institutional Loyalties
Institutional loyalty can be observed among contemporary
officials in all three branches. Although we can identify instances
of institutional loyalty in quite disparate circumstances, we make
no claim here about their relative frequency in comparison to
other motivations (for example, partisan, ideological, and so on).
More modestly, we think institutional loyalty is not a marginal
phenomenon. It has played meaningful roles in many important
constitutional-law disputes. We offer a range of illustrations
drawn from each of the three branches, extending our discussion
in the Introduction.105 We err on the side of numerosity given that
the idea of institutional loyalty is broad—for reasons explored at
the end of this Part.
1. The executive branch.
We begin by offering instances of institutional loyalty at work
within the executive. We start with high-profile post-9/11 claims
of executive authority in the Bush administration. We then turn
to equally controversial debates about executive authority in the
foreign policy area during the Obama administration.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush White
House articulated a “concede[dly] . . . aggressive” view of executive
authority that would have preempted or narrowed congressional
directives on military deployment, detention, torture, and electronic surveillance.106 Other policy paths of less resistance existed
but were rejected because of a loyalty to a particular constitutional role for the executive. Many (but not all) of the policies
pursued under this Article II flag could have been supported by
“creative[,] . . . perhaps even tendentious,” interpretations of federal statutes.107 Republicans controlled the House until 2007, and
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See text accompanying notes 11–22.
David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
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the Senate after 2002, and likely would have supported new statutes authorizing much of what the Bush administration argued
that Article II granted it the power to do.108
But members of the Bush administration, and in particular
Vice President Richard Cheney, offered a different account. On
their view, decisions were motivated by a personal commitment
to establishing an expansive constitutional role of the executive,
which in their view had been unduly cabined since the 1970s.109
In their own words, President Bush and Cheney had a longstanding desire “to leave the presidency stronger than they found
it.”110 This assertion of this view of executive authority nevertheless ran the risk of “achiev[ing] the opposite” by cultivating “a
harmful suspicion and mistrust.”111 Cheney, at a minimum, was
quite aware that “personal leadership, public education, political
support, and interbranch comity” all might be determinants of
executive power.112 But he nevertheless advanced Article II
grounds, even though they raised unnecessary, costly, and divisive objections to immediate policy choices, because they
advanced the institutional authority of the presidency.113
The example of Cheney is an interesting one for our purposes
because his fidelity to the executive branch was evident both
when he sat in the White House and also while he was a member
of the House of Representatives. It is worth remembering that
Cheney started his career in the White House as an assistant to
Donald Rumsfeld in the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1969–
1970. He rose to the position of White House chief of staff for
President Gerald Ford before he ever set foot in Congress.114
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Id at 713–14.
For a discussion of the origins and evolution of the Cheney view about executive
power, see Scott Shane, Recent Flexing of Presidential Powers Had Personal Roots in Ford
White House (NY Times, Dec 30, 2006), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/30/washington/30roots.html (visited Oct 19, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
110 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush
Administration 140 (Norton 2007).
111 Id.
112 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S
Rep No 100-216, HR Rep No 100-433, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 438 (1987).
113 See, for example, Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 99–102
(Penguin 2008); Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr and Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced:
Presidential Power in a Time of Terror 187–200 (New Press 2007); Jane Mayer, The
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130 (Threshold 2011).
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It is consistent with our view of institutional loyalties that
Cheney seems to have formulated strong views about the executive branch as an employee of the executive branch and then
maintained those views even as he moved to a different branch of
government. Hence, the fact that Representative Cheney held the
same views as Chief of Staff Cheney and Vice President Cheney
does not undermine our claim; rather, it shows the potential for
institutional loyalties to stick notwithstanding transitions between different branches of government.
Of course, this need not always be the case. There are other
famous instances of interbranch transition—think of Chief
Justice John Marshall, who served in the House, the Adams
administration, and on the Court,115 or Chief Justice Roger
Taney116—not characterized by the same tenacity of initial institutional fidelity.
While Cheney and his colleagues were motivated by an institutional loyalty to expand the power of the executive branch,
other cabinet officials and senior political appointees resisted some
of their efforts because of their institutional loyalties. Attorney
General Ashcroft was a former Republican governor and senator
who was “controversial because of his impassioned advocacy of
conservative causes.”117 As he lay in an intensive care unit in the
hospital on the night of March 10, 2004, though, Ashcroft
summoned the energy to resist White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card when they asked him
to reauthorize a domestic surveillance program. Ashcroft later
testified and wrote that he refused to sign because he believed the
program to be legally flawed. He was supported by Comey, who
in his own testimony indicated that he believed the White House
to be usurping the institutional role of the Department of Justice
in deciding what is legal.118
Institutional loyalty, moreover, is not the preserve of one administration or one party. In 2011, Obama determined that he did
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Charles M. Ellis, Roger B. Taney and the Leviathan of Slavery (The Atlantic, Feb
1865), archived at http://perma.cc/N642-VJAM.
117 Alison Mitchell, Ashcroft Debate Shows Deep Rifts (NY Times, Feb 1, 2001), online
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118 James Risen and Michael S. Schmidt, 2004 Showdown Shaped Reputation of Pick for
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not need congressional authorization under the War Powers
Resolution119 to continue air strikes in Libya.120 This conclusion
was resisted by two political appointees—Jeh Johnson, the
general counsel of the Department of Defense, and Caroline
Krass, the acting head of the OLC at the Department of Justice.121
Johnson had been a political appointee during the Clinton administration, had raised money and campaigned for past Democratic
presidential nominees,122 and would later serve as secretary of
Homeland Security for Obama. Krass had previously served as a
special advisor to Obama,123 and would later become his general
counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).124 Despite these
partisan commitments, though, both Johnson and Krass argued
to Obama that his legal conclusions were incorrect, and a former
head of the OLC, Walter Dellinger, criticized the president’s
“unusual process” of rejecting OLC and other legal advice from
within the executive branch as problematic.125 In so doing, they
reflected an institutional alignment at odds with traditional
stories of partisanship and ideology.126
2. The judiciary.
Two recent examples highlight the possibility of institutional
loyalty among federal judges. A first high-salience example of a
justice acting against perceived ideological preferences as a result
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of what apparently were institutional concerns is, as noted previously, Roberts’s alleged switch to vote in favor of upholding the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act127 (ACA) in National
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius128 (“NFIB”).
Commentators immediately characterized Roberts’s decision as
“a brilliant act of judicial statesmanship” that shielded the Court,
as an institution, from accusation of partisan bias.129 Roberts’s
vote, we think, is hard to explain purely in terms of his known
ideological preferences.130 Consistent with that view, many
conservative commentators subsequently condemned the chief
justice in no uncertain terms as an ideological turncoat.131
Although it is not possible to say with certainty what motivated
Roberts, we think that institutional loyalties are plausibly
thought to have played a role.
Similarly, in the wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely
death in 2016, the chief justice, and other justices, made seemingly concerted efforts to “find consensus whenever possible” by
avoiding 4–4 splits and reducing the number of disputes in its
pipeline.132 In Zubik v Burwell,133 the justices were asked to decide
whether regulations issued pursuant to the ACA, mandating that
employers provide contraception coverage to women violated the
statutory rights of nonprofit religious employers.134 Just two years
earlier, the Court divided 5–4 in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc135 about the related issue of whether the mandate unduly burdened the religious freedoms of for-profit corporations.136
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Wrath from the Right (NY Times, Sept 28, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
29/us/politics/chief-justice-john-roberts-amasses-conservative-record-and-the-rights-ire.html
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By the time oral argument transpired on March 23, 2016,
Scalia had died, leaving a likely 4–4 split on the Court.137 Obama
had also nominated Garland of the US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit to replace Scalia, leading to Republican
opposition and placing the Court in the midst of the heated political debate in a presidential election year yet again.138 Less than
one week after oral argument, the eight justices unanimously
“issued an unusual order”139 directing the parties to file supplemental briefs finding a compromise outcome that both sides
would find agreeable.140 In May, the Court issued an unsigned
unanimous opinion remanding the case to the lower courts to find
an acceptable compromise order.141
As in the NFIB case, the justices appeared to behave in ways
inconsistent with their ideological preferences (that is, their sincerely held opinions about the substance of the law), and instead
consonant with the interests of the judiciary as an institution. A
polarized and deadlocked Court avoided dividing on ideological or
jurisprudential grounds in order to preserve the public perception
of the Court as above and independent of politics. This was
certainly the interpretation of the opinion by many of those who
follow the Supreme Court most closely.142 Indeed, Justice Elena

politics/supreme-court-case-on-contraceptives-mandate-may-offer-little-closure.html (visited Oct 19, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting how Zubik “builds on” Hobby
Lobby).
137 See, for example, Liptak, Justices Seem Split (cited in note 136).
138 Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick Garland
Fight (CNN, Nov 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/D8SR-W5EE.
139 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Hints at Way to Avert Tie on Birth Control Mandate
(NY Times, Mar 29, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/politics/
supreme-court-hints-at-way-to-avert-tie-on-birth-control-mandate.html (visited Oct 19,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (“The Supreme Court . . . issued an unusual order indicating that the justices are trying to avoid a 4-to-4 deadlock in a case pitting religious
freedom against access to contraception.”).
140 Zubik v Burwell, 2016 WL 1203818, *2 (US) (“The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs that address whether and how contraceptive coverage may be obtained
by petitioners’ employees through petitioners’ insurance companies, but in a way that does
not require any involvement of petitioners beyond their own decision to provide health
insurance without contraceptive coverage to their employees.”).
141 Zubik, 136 S Ct at 1560 (“[T]he parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious
exercise while . . . ensuring that women . . . receive full and equal health coverage.”) (quotation marks omitted).
142 See Adam Liptak, Justices, Seeking Compromise, Return Contraception Case to
Lower Courts (NY Times, May 16, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/
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Kagan confirmed this interpretation during a subsequent public
appearance.143
3. Congress.
Examples of institutional loyalty influencing the collective
action of either Congress or a single chamber are more difficult to
discern than their judicial- or executive-branch analogs. A threshold
problem is that in many instances, Congress asserts its interests
by what Professor David Mayhew calls “non-levering”—that is,
exercising a veto by nonaction.144 There are many examples, to be
sure, of legislative assertions of institutional prerogative as a
means toward a partisan end. For example, the Senate’s refusal
to hold confirmation hearings for Obama’s nomination for the
Supreme Court vacancy left by Scalia’s sudden demise sounds in
institutional prerogative. Similarly, a lawsuit filed by the House
of Representatives challenging expenditures on the ACA has
resulted in a district-court opinion that endorses a legislative
power to challenge violations of the Appropriations Clause.145 But
we think both are better understood as partisan initiatives with
small positive institutional spillovers.146
Better examples of institutional loyalty on Congress’s part
focus on costly legislative acts that have little immediate partisan
or electoral payoff, but that have enabled the legislative branch
as a whole to pursue its identified interests in the long term. That

to avoid 4-to-4 deadlocks, even if it does not decide the question the justices have agreed
to address”).
143 See Jesse Byrnes, Kagan: Eight-Judge Supreme Court “Working Really Hard” to
Avoid Deadlocks (The Hill, Apr 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2K8Q-TGRB (quoting
Kagan as stating that “[a]ll of us are working hard to reach agreement” and all are “especially concerned” about reaching consensus).
144 David R. Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress 98 (Yale 2017) (emphasis omitted).
145 See United States House of Representatives v Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d 53, 81 (DDC
2015) (“The House of Representatives has standing to pursue its allegations that the
Secretaries of Health and Human Services and of the Treasury violated Article I, § 9, cl. 7
of the Constitution when they spent public monies that were not appropriated by the
Congress.”); United States House of Representatives v Burwell, 185 F Supp 3d 165, 168
(DDC 2016) (finding a violation of the Appropriations Clause in the same suit).
146 In a similar fashion, many of the public “actions” that Professor David Mayhew
famously charted in his landmark history can be explained by individual-level prestige.
See David R. Mayhew, America’s Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison
through Newt Gingrich 37 (Yale 2000). At the same time, Mayhew emphasizes that
Congress “has absorbed a large share of the country’s most talented and ambitious politicians” into its “opportunity structure.” Id at 218. An implication of this observation is that
the future career prospects of many pivotal national figures turn on the institutional fortunes of the legislative branch—thus entangling the institutional and the personal.
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is, when a legislative action produces little or no certain shortterm policy effect, but in the long term enables Congress, it is
more likely to be explained by institutionally oriented motives.
The leading comparative study of institutional design changes
within Congress, by political scientist Professor Schickler, highlights the plurality of motives that underscore many legislative
acts.147 Notwithstanding that finding, Schickler identifies several
instances in which what we call institutional loyalties were decisive (if not uniquely at play). The first of these is the LRA, which
“sought to enhance Congress’s position relative to the executive
by strengthening congressional committees and by providing new
integrative devices, such as party policy committees and a
centralized budget process, to coordinate committee activities.”148
As we have noted, the LRA slimmed the number of committees in
both the House and the Senate as a means to empowering more
effective congressional oversight. To that end, it also authorized
additional staff to help professionalize legislators’ offices.149
Congressional debates show that legislators were concerned by
the disjunction between a rapidly expanding executive branch
and a Congress that had “relatively stood still.”150 This “remarkably consistent message from Democrats and Republicans across
the ideological spectrum” about Article I power and “prestige”
helped enact a measure that stripped many members of the
perquisites of committee leadership and membership—that is,
diluted their personal power without advancing an ideological or
partisan goal.151 The LRA’s history is also striking in that it is
characterized by a bipartisan recognition of the positive role that
government plays—in contrast to the relentless attacks on government from Republicans in particular since the 1980s.
But the 1946 Act is not the only instance of Congress acting
in its own defense that Schickler identifies. Between 1889 and
1990, he finds that at least nine out of forty-two institutional
reforms in Congress were motivated in part by what he calls
“Congress or chamber-oriented interests” as distinct from party
interests, policy interests, and reelection-related interests.152 In
147 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 12–13 (cited in note 22) (noting the presence of
“multiple interests” behind many institutional changes).
148 Id at 14.
149 Id at 146–50 (explaining why this was not a “cartelistic” move by the majority).
150 Id at 141–42, citing S 2177, 79th Cong, 2d Sess (May 13, 1946), in 92 Cong Rec
6558 (June 10, 1946) (statement of Sen Bridges).
151 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 142–43 (cited in note 22).
152 Id at 256.
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addition to the LRA, Schickler identifies appropriations and
Senate committee reform in the 1920s, the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy of 1946, and the Stevenson committee reforms of
1977 as relevant examples.153 The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, for instance, was created after World War II as a joint
body with members from both the House and Senate exercising
sole jurisdiction, sole power to report relevant legislation, and
important oversight powers over the vital and growing postwar
policy question of how to manage atomic energy.154 Like the LRA,
the Joint Committee emerged from a bipartisan consensus that
Congress needed the institutional capacity to keep up with regulatory growth within the executive.155 In short, the “middle to late
twentieth century” was a particularly fruitful period for such
reforms, as Congress endeavored to respond systematically to
increasing executive-branch authority.156
In addition to Schickler’s examples, Professor Josh Chafetz’s
recent survey of congressional powers identifies the creation of
the General Accounting Office and the Senate’s defense of its
prerogatives in relation to treaties as instances of legislative selfassertion that are not well explained by partisan or ideological
motives.157 The former, created in 1920, was intended to fashion a
new accounting department that would be accountable “only to
Congress” and that would give Congress “the very facts that
Congress ought to be in possession of.”158 Building on Chafetz’s
list, we think that the Congressional Budgeting Office, which is
tasked with issuing estimates of how much proposed legislation
will cost the federal fisc, is an institutional innovation that reflects institutional rather than partisan or ideological interests.159

153

Id at 257.
Id at 150–51.
155 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 152–53 (cited in note 22). Indeed, Schickler
finds that the Joint Committee was the “only formal, floor-approved change [to Congress’s
processes] that is explained by a single interest,” that is, in congressional capacity. Id at 249.
156 Id at 257. See also Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress at 115 (cited in note 144)
(“Congress can also put its feet down, taking authority back or saying to the White House
that enough is enough.”).
157 Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 31, 63 (cited in note 10).
158 Thomas D. Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 NC L Rev 1279, 1281 (1973), quoting 66th
Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 17, 1919), in 58 Cong Rec 7085 (remarks of Rep Good).
159 For details of the Congressional Budget Office’s operation, see Philip G. Joyce, The
Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Power, and Policymaking 224 (Georgetown
2011); Walter J. Oleszek, et al, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 66–76 (CQ
10th ed 2016).
154

36

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1

Some scholars have identified the federal budgeting process
as a “centralizing change intended to safeguard congressional
power.”160 In 1974, provoked by President Richard Nixon’s
aggressive use of impoundment authority, Congress passed the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974,161 which
provided a framework for coordinated committee consideration of
expenditures, and a predictable set of mechanisms for legislative
deliberation over the final packet of budget proposals.162 At its
heart was the new annual congressional budget resolution, which
set forth “overall national fiscal policies” at the beginning of the
budgeting process, thereby enabling coordination toward a final
appropriations measure.163 Although these new procedures can be
glossed as means of empowering Congress as an institution, they
can also be seen as a mechanism for empowering members of
budget committees while increasing the time in which members
could seek payoffs consistent with game-theoretic models of selfserving legislative behavior.164 Although Schickler does find evidence of institutional motives in relation to the 1974 Budget Act,
we think the force of parochial interests may be stronger here
than in the other cases mentioned above.
Finally, Professors Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein have
recently suggested that the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act165
(APA) is similarly a historical “compromise” between proregulatory and antiregulatory forces, which is not “generally and
systematically progressive, or proregulatory, or anything else.”166
If they are correct, the APA should be understood as a farsighted
investment in a legal framework that enabled Congress to achieve
its shifting regulatory goals without having to create a basic legal
framework from the ground up each time it did so. Professor
Elizabeth Garrett has identified other forms of “framework
legislation” that Congress has enacted and still enforces that
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163 Stith, 76 Cal L Rev at 617 (cited in note 162).
164 See Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson, Bicameralism and Its Consequences
for the Internal Organization of Legislatures, 89 Am Econ Rev 1182, 1188–92 (1999). We
are grateful to Brian Feinstein for discussion on this point.
165 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
166 Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U Chi
L Rev 393, 465–66 (2015).
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could be described in a similar fashion to budgetary legislation or
the APA.167
Although we have assembled examples of institutional loyalty manifesting within Congress, we do not wish to exaggerate
the force of our claim. It may once have been the case that
Congress engaged in robust self-defense of its institutional prerogatives168 by (among other things) resisting judicial orders of
which it disapproved.169 But it is striking that all of our examples
are relatively removed from the contemporary moment. This suggests that institutional loyalties have eroded over time as a result
of many forces, both within and outside Congress.170 Today, only
a pale shadow of their former force may be felt.
***
Institutional loyalty can be observed motivating recent actions of all three of the branches. Each of our examples highlights
an instance in which loyalty prevailed against countervailing
partisan or ideological concerns. Our examples not only provide
evidence of institutional loyalty but also show how the latter
influences officials’ ultimate actions, notwithstanding partisan or
ideological preferences. Because we have selected relatively highprofile examples, we are confident that institutional loyalties
cannot be written off as a marginal phenomenon: they are instead
a meaningful element of contemporary separation-of-powers
dynamics.
Our examples, however, leave open the questions of why and
how the strength of institutional loyalties has fluctuated over
time and how such changes have interacted with shifts in partisan and ideological attachment. It seems likely that the core claim
167 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J Contemp
Legal Issues 717, 718 (2005) (“Framework legislation creates rules that structure congressional lawmaking; these laws establish internal procedures that will shape legislative
deliberation and voting with respect to certain laws or decisions in the future. They are
laws about the congressional lawmaking process itself.”).
168 See Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 Wm
& Mary L Rev 1495, 1501 (2017) (“The early Congresses were vigorous defenders of legislative prerogatives.”).
169 See Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 25–
28 (West 5th ed 2011) (discussing Congress’s express disapproval of the Marbury v Madison
litigation, its resulting cancellation of the Supreme Court’s 1802 term, and its refusal to
honor a Court order to turn over documents concerning the Marbury appointment).
170 See, for example, Neal Devins, The Constitutional Politics of Congress, in Mark
Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, and Sanford Levinson, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the U.S.
Constitution 155, 170–75 (Oxford 2015).
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of the modern position—that ideological and partisan loyalties
dominate—is itself a contingent historical artifact of the ebbing
strength of institutional loyalties. Indeed, one benefit of bringing
to bear the concept of institutional loyalties is that it casts light
on the process of motivational change within the political elites
charged with managing the three branches of government.
For example, rates of both partisan polarization among political elites and party discipline within Congress have changed
markedly over time171 in ways that may have influenced the
strength of institutional loyalties. Polarization, for example, arguably undermines legislators’ willingness to pursue institutional
rather than partisan ends as party leadership exercise greater
agenda control in pursuit of distinct and ideologically incompatible agendas.172 On the other hand, the decline of institutional
loyalties—say as a result of increasingly lucrative exit options for
former members of Congress—may have contributed to the growing force of partisan and ideological preferences. The interaction
between partisan or ideological motives and institutional loyalties provides a motor driving changes to institutional behavior
over time. It would thus be a mistake to describe the motivations
of key actors in our constitutional system as static, rather than as
dynamic and evolving over time.
II. THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY
If institutional loyalty is neither impossible nor inevitable,
how does it come to be in the first instance? This Part focuses on
the question of how institutional loyalties arise. Our aim here is
to identify and loosely categorize the discrete choices made by the
designer of a constitution, or of important national institutions,
that make officials either more or less likely to identify with and
seek to promote the goals of their institutional home. We identify
two relevant margins of design. Each can be manipulated in two
different ways.
First, we explore the influence of institutional design on the
selection of institutional personnel. Institutional designers have
171 For information on political polarization among political elites, see Richard H. Pildes,
Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99
Cal L Rev 273, 287–97 (2011). For information on party discipline over time, see James
M. Snyder Jr and Tim Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call
Voting, 44 Am J Pol Sci 193, 198–99 (2000) (Figure 1).
172 See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration
of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 762–68 (2011).
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a large measure of control over entrance and exit rules. The terms
of entrance and exit by officials into an institution, therefore,
select not only on the kind of officials who opt into the institution
in the first instance, but also the extent to which they remain long
enough to develop institutional loyalty.173
Second, we posit that officials’ preferences are shaped and
regulated by organizational socialization, and in particular the
social context in which they operate. Social context, operating
both within and around an institution, can foster “durable, transposable dispositions . . . [that in turn will] generate and organize
practices” by which branches, agencies, and organizations implement missions.174 We explore two mechanisms through which
institutional designers can use organizational socialization to
promote loyalty and identification with an institution. First, the
choice of institutional mandate can influence the extent of such
identification. Second, we explore how institutional designers can
harness, and even seed, wider social networks that surround an
institution, generating or reinforcing positive (or negative) loyalty
toward an institution.
All these mechanisms can operate at the level of constitutional design, understood as the written work product of the
Philadelphia Convention and successive amendment. Because
the 1787 Constitution does not comprehensively describe the full
institutional landscape of the federal government, however, it
also leaves ample room for legislators and presidents to develop
the “small-‘c’” constitution, which comprises “the fundamental
political institutions of a society, or the constitution in practice.”175
As a result of the Constitution’s incompleteness, many possible
avenues for institutional reform (some of which are identified in
Part III) remain open. We hence sketch here mechanisms that are
available both to constitutional drafters and more mundane
administrators of government.

173 Many legal rules “produce feedback effects that, over time, bring new types of government officials into power.” Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 953 (cited in note 25). We are
concerned with a narrower class of selection-related rules.
174 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 53 (Polity 1990) (Richard Nice, trans).
Pierre Bourdieu called this a “habitus.” Id (emphasis omitted). Our analysis is consistent
with Bourdieu’s frame although we do not employ that relatively unfamiliar terminology.
175 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev
1457, 1459–60 (2001).
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Entrance and Promotion Rules

A first means to elicit institutionally disposed officials is to
employ devices for regulating the threshold choice of official hires
in ways that sort the institutionally minded from those with selfserving or ideological or partisan motives, and to ensure that only
the former are promoted within the organization.176 Some (but not
all) of the design options described in this Section operate through
a demand for a costly signal. Such measures leverage the insight
that when the cost of a qualification “is negatively correlated with
the unseen characteristic that is valuable to the employers,” it can
be used to distinguish “good” types (who easily acquire it) from
“bad” types (who do not find getting the qualification worthwhile).177 In addition to devices that select for more institutionally
minded candidates, an institutional designer can sculpt criteria
for promotion—that is, the shape of the job ladder—to select
right-minded individuals. We begin by exploring selection
mechanisms in the constitutional context, before using statutory
examples to illustrate other mechanisms not identified or used in
the Constitution’s text.
As noted, Madison, in Federalist 51, asserted that “[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place.”178 The balance of The Federalist Papers reveals scant
attention, however, to the important question of how this connection would be made. In contrast, Publius pays close attention to
how selection rules for the branches conduce to virtuous officials.
In Federalist 10, most famously, Madison developed a theory of
the “extended” republic, in which the process of representation
would dilute local factions and “refine and enlarge the public
views.”179 As we discussed in Part I, though, virtuous officials are
not necessarily those with institutional loyalty.180
At best, Publius’s argument offers mere hints of how institutional loyalty might be produced by selection. In Federalist 57,
Madison suggested that an elected official’s “pride and vanity

176

See Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 956–57 (cited in note 25).
Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,
92 Am Econ Rev 434, 437 (2002) (emphasis added). See also Michael Spence, Job Market
Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 361–68 (1973) (presenting the original model).
178 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
179 Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 62–63 (cited in note 3).
180 See text accompanying notes 168–70 (discussing the lack of institutional loyalty
in today’s Congress when compared with other branches).
177
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[would] attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions, and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions,”181
perhaps including those of an institutional character. Madison in
Federalist 62 glosses the pre–Seventeenth Amendment regime of
state legislative power to appoint senators not only as a way of
“giving to the state governments . . . an agency in . . . the federal
government”182 but also as a means of picking senators with “due
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation.”183 The
latter phrase might be glossed (with some difficulty) as an
inclination to attend to the rights and interests of a legislating
institution. Finally, Hamilton emphasized in Federalist 78 that
Article III judges would be appointed via the same method as
principal officers of the executive branch—and also praised
judges for their expected quality of “judgment.”184 Although this
again might be read as evidence of selection for an institutional
loyalty, it also suggests an optimistic view of the filtering power
of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.185
We do not think that these hints add up to a complete account
of the Constitution’s selection mechanisms as a means for
promoting institutional identification. Nor do we think such a
comprehensive theory, explaining how the Constitution selects
for both public virtue and institutional loyalty, can be developed
from the constitutional text alone. As Professor Joanne Freeman
has explained, it is not obvious that the Framers’ ideas about republican virtue can be reconciled entirely with their commitment
to representative democracy.186 Trying to knead their invocations
of public virtue into claims about institutional loyalty seems even
more implausible. As a theorist of institutional loyalty as a matter
of constitutional design, therefore, Publius falls far short.
Other constitutional designers have done better. In many
other jurisdictions, the judiciary is organized as a form of civil
service with lifetime career paths. Career judiciaries rely on
181

Federalist 57 at 386 (cited in note 72).
Federalist 62 (Madison), in The Federalist 415, 416–17 (cited in note 3).
183 Id at 419.
184 Federalist 78 at 522–23 (cited in note 68).
185 See Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 509, 513 (cited in note 3) (arguing
that the president will not be tempted by “private inclinations and interests” or “a spirit
of favoritism” because of the specter of reputational harms from a Senate rejection of a
nominee).
186 Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic 37
(Yale 2001) (describing a “fundamental contradiction of republican politics[:] When both
personal reputations and political careers rested on popular approval, what was the distinction between public-minded lawmaking and demagoguery?”).
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costly signals insofar as they demand that judges renounce potentially lucrative private careers early in their professional lives. By
building job ladders within the judiciary, career judiciaries also
align the professional ambitions of judges with the goals of the
court system as a whole. In Germany, for example, Professor John
Langbein characterized the judiciary as a prestigious career
choice, open only to those with the “best” academic credentials in
their study in programs dedicated to the law, with partisan
considerations playing a “very subordinate” role.187 Promotion depended on meritocratic evaluation by peer judges, with partisan
considerations playing a much lesser role.
Langbein, the leading American commentator on the German
judicial system, reaches an unequivocal judgment: its career path
attracts the “very able” to the bench and then assures that “career
advancement [is] congruent with the legitimate interests of the
litigants.”188 The German judiciary, in short, selects for and cultivates an institutional loyalty by orienting its officials toward
excellence in the performance of the institution’s central task:
settling disputes fairly. Of course, mere installation of a career
judiciary is no panacea.189 Rather, we flag the German example as
evidence that other constitutional designers may have identified
ways of eliciting desirable institutional loyalty among civil
servants.
Institutional loyalty might also be cultivated, or diminished,
through statutory selection mechanisms. The modern American
civil service has a series of rules that embody both costly entrance
mechanisms and also promotion schemes that entangle individual
and institutional ambitions. Contrary to the standard “starting
point in analyzing politicians’ behaviors[,] that they are socially
motivated,”190 careful attention to these schemes shows how extant
statutory frameworks carefully cultivate institutional loyalty.
Starting with the Pendleton Act of 1883,191 statutory civilservice laws have contained filtration mechanisms, such as

187 John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823,
849–53 (1985).
188 Id at 848.
189 During the second half of the twentieth century, the dominant Liberal Democratic
Party in Japan used its control over the judiciary’s administrative apparatus to promote
partisan ends. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J Legal Stud 721, 725 (1994).
190 Rafael di Tella and Raymond Fisman, Are Politicians Really Paid like Bureaucrats?,
47 J L & Econ 477, 478 (2004).
191 22 Stat 403 (1883).
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competitive entrance exams.192 The current merit hiring process
for the federal civil service requires that career positions are filled
based on objective skill and experience.193 These threshold
mechanisms make long-term government service less attractive
for those with strong partisan or pecuniary motives, but lacking
in relevant skills or subject-matter expertise. As a result, these
screens narrow the pool of applicants to those most likely to
internalize an institutional loyalty, even if applicants themselves
are unlikely to have such loyalty before taking on a government
position.
In addition to navigating these screens, professional civil
servants must forgo the greater compensation typically available
in the private sector when choosing to enter public service.
Lawyers, engineers, scientists, and accountants all earn far less
than their counterparts in the private sector.194 This public/private
salary differential has two effects. Like competitive exams, it
again selects against certain types (for example, those primarily
motivated by personal pecuniary motives). And by ousting highpowered incentives,195 it also preserves space for other forms of
motivation. Institutional ambitions and norms are, as a result,
far more likely to infuse the preferences and behavior of officials
than would be the case absent the civil-service regime’s constraints on political and pecuniary motives.196

192 The Pendleton Act’s competitive exam structure, however, was not mandatory. See
Pendleton Act § 2, 22 Stat at 403–04.
193 See 5 USC § 2301(b) (setting forth merit-related criteria and distinguishing impermissible criteria). See also Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 § 3(2), Pub L No 95-454,
92 Stat 1111, 1111–12.
194 Congressional Budget Office, Comparing the Compensation of Federal and PrivateSector Employees *6–7 (Jan 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/TW96-YMG3.
195 High-powered incentives flow from market transactions, in which efficiency gains
flow to the transacting parties. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 90–91 (Free Press 1985).
196 See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control
and Bureaucratic Performance 30 (Princeton 2008) (noting that civil servants “often feel
bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to certain courses of action and these courses
of action may be at variance with the president’s agenda”); M. Todd Henderson and
Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S Cal L Rev 1003, 1007 (2012) (“In the
absence of high-powered incentives, it is assumed that those individuals who self-select
into regulatory jobs will value public service and will do the work of aligning performance
with desired social welfare outcomes.”). Professors M. Todd Henderson and Frederick
Tung raise the possibility that regulators may also simply prefer leisure to the harder
work of the private sector but give no reasons for thinking this is a more significant
dynamic in the public sector than in the private sector. See Henderson and Tung, 85 S Cal
L Rev at 1007 (cited in note 196).
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These threshold mechanisms can be complemented by a
promotion structure that elicits institutional loyalty even more
actively. Promotions depend on “seniority and the passage of
time, rather than on productivity,” or evidence of skill.197 Partisan
and pecuniary motives are excluded as grounds of official action
by the civil-service laws. The 1939 Hatch Act198 ensured that “employment and advancement in the Government service [does] not
depend on political performance,”199 just as the honest services
law rules out self-interested pecuniary motives among elected officials.200 Legal historian Nicholas Parrillo has charted the demise
of profit as a motivating force within the federal bureaucracy as
fees and bounties gradually fell into desuetude, to be supplanted
by fixed, outcome-independent salaries.201 To the extent that salary competition does occur now, it is channeled through a centralized system of classifications of different bureaucratic positions
for salary purposes—a context in which institutional priorities
are highly influential.202
Finally, once partisan and pecuniary motives are taken off
the table, civil servants also tend to have long careers closely tied
to their home institutions. Turnover in federal employment is
low. In each year between 2004 and 2012, data from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) shows that about 0.7 percent of
federal employees were fired, between 2.4 to 3 percent resigned,
and between 2.5 and 3.6 percent retired.203 While OMB does not
retain distinct data on rates of internal promotion and hiring, this
exceedingly low rate of exit (around 7 percent) suggests that promotion from outside the federal bureaucracy is relatively rare.
The sheer expected durability of federal employment tends to

197 Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected Bureaucracy, and
Reinventing Government, 37 Ariz L Rev 791, 822 (1995).
198 53 Stat 1147 (1939).
199 Civil Service Commission v National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 US 548,
566 (1973) (discussing the Hatch Act § 9(a), 53 Stat at 1148).
200 See text accompanying notes 96–98.
201 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American
Government, 1780–1940 1–4 (Yale 2013) (tracing the process by which American lawmakers
went from paying public officials by fees for service and bounties to paying them fixed
salaries).
202 See Burke D. Grandjean, History and Career in a Bureaucratic Labor Market, 86
Am J Sociology 1057, 1058–59 (1981) (discussing how “occupational prestige” influences
classification of bureaucratic positions for salary purposes).
203 See US Government Accountability Office, Recent Trends in Federal Civilian
Employment and Compensation *17 (Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K8UU-UUPV.
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deepen identification with a home institution.204 Simply put, officials who anticipate that their career will be entangled with a
specific institution have a reason to advance the interests of that
institution qua institution.205
B.

Exit Rules

Institutional loyalty can be elicited by imposing costs on officials’ exit from an institution. Costly institutional exit arises when
officials incur high opportunity costs if they depart an institution
or obtain low or artificially suppressed returns from external
opportunities. As a result of the benefits of staying put and the
costs of departure, officials are more likely to remain in their
home institution, and concomitantly more likely to identify their
career goals with the larger goals of the institution. Costly exit
has been identified as an important mechanism in both the labor
economics and the public administration literature.206 Its links to
constitutional and statutory rules, not to mention its larger constitutional function, have so far received insufficient attention.
Costly exit mechanisms operate in two ways. First, high
returns to serving in an institution increase the odds of longer
terms of service. Longer civil-service tenures function in this
regard akin to life tenure for federal judges. In expectation, such
tenures increase the degree of identification between an official
and the institution with which her career is entangled. Regardless of the length of intended institutional service, moreover, high
returns from continued service can immediately benefit institutions. An official receiving large returns to institutional service,
like any well-compensated employee,207 is more likely to be well
disposed to her institution, and hence more likely to formulate
and adopt a view of what is in its best interest.

204 See James L. Perry, Bringing Society In: Toward a Theory of Public-Service Motivation, 10 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 471, 479–83 (2000).
205 See Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 955–64 (cited in note 25) (identifying mechanisms
whereby longitudinal effects can generate new officials with power).
206 See Anthony M. Bertelli and David E. Lewis, Policy Influence, Agency-Specific
Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service, 23 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 223, 235–39
(2012); Sean Gailmard, Politics, Principal-Agent Problems, and Public Service Motivation,
13 Intl Pub Mgmt J 35, 40–42 (2010); Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty, Slackers and
Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 Am J Polit Sci 873,
880–86 (2007).
207 See Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device, 74 Am Econ Rev 433, 435–41 (1984).
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High returns, moreover, need not take a monetary form.
Public officials can instead be motivated by the opportunity to
shape policy or by reputational gains.208 High-ranking officials in
all three branches of government are likely to have forsaken
greater financial rewards in the private sector in order to receive
returns from policy influence. Chief Justice Roberts, for instance,
was earning more than $1 million every year in private practice
in 2003 when he accepted President Bush’s nomination to the US
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and thereby
embraced a position with roughly one-sixth the salary.209 His
tenure protection and opportunities for policy-related discretion
are one form of compensation for the opportunity costs of forgoing
private practice. Indeed, to the extent that this effectual wage is
greater than Roberts’s market wage, life tenure may comprise an
implicit efficiency wage.210
A constitutional designer can use policy influence as a compensatory incentive in lieu of pecuniary rewards, and thereby
elicit institutional loyalty. Article III judges, for example, cannot
have their salary reduced while in office. Their salary is essentially a lifetime guaranteed annuity so long as the judge is not
impeached.211 This guarantee is justified as a (surely partial and
imperfect) way of ensuring “an independent Judiciary”212 that is
“free from control by the Executive and the Legislature.”213
An institutional function is thus pursued through the shaping of individual incentives. By assigning judges the opportunity
to influence the path of the law as an important form of implicit
compensation, the Constitution gives individual judges a stake in
the judiciary as a whole. Their policy discretion depends on the
judiciary’s continued prestige and legitimacy. As a result, judges

208 For empirical studies demonstrating a motivation to shape policy by federal officials, see generally Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments (cited in note 196);
Anthony M. Bertelli, Determinants of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention: Evidence from the
Department of the Treasury, 17 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 235 (2007).
209 Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy (New Yorker, May 25, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/RTK3-8S22.
210 See Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and CostBenefit Analysis, 98 Va L Rev 579, 623, 625–26 (2012) (discussing efficiency wages).
211 US Const Art III, § 1, cl 2 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
212 United States v Will, 449 US 200, 217, 220–21 (1980) (stating that salary protections
and tenure “ensure[ ] a [ ] judge . . . the compensation” that will overcome the temptations
of the “more lucrative” world of “private practice”).
213 Id at 218.
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have a strong incentive to maintain the institutional predicates
of policy influence. Further, the expectation of a durable judicial
career means that even if a judge’s influence at a given moment
in time is minimal, her opportunities for shaping the law can reoccur over an extended period of time—resulting in an eventually
significant amount of policy influence.
Statutory regimes can also use the promise of policy influence
to generate institutional loyalty. Agency designers can allocate
either substantive powers or formal titles as means to assign both
responsibility and influence to specific personnel.214 A recent
example involves the reorganization of the intelligence services
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to include a new
leadership position, a “Director of National Intelligence” (DNI).215
The DNI was made by statute the head of the intelligence
community, the primary adviser to the president on matters of
intelligence related to national security, the authoritative voice
on the intelligence budget, and the hiring authority for key officials in the intelligence community.216 Whereas the head of the
intelligence community had formerly been the CIA chief, the new
DNI is independent of any specific component of the intelligence
bureaucracy.217 By augmenting the powers of the intelligence
leadership position, while detaching it from any specific agency,
members of Congress hoped to instill a larger, government-wide
sense of mission in the office—one not dogged by the parochial
concerns of a particular agency.218 Implicit in the DNI’s new powers, moreover, is the possibility that the office’s occupant would
be blamed politically if the intelligence community failed to
prevent another spectacular terrorist attack akin to 9/11. In this
fashion, legislators may have hoped to align future DNIs’ personal interests with the executive’s larger mission of mitigating
national security risks rather than more parochial institutional
concerns.
The force of such bureaucratic incentives, however, often
depends on the strength and durability of the underlying agency.
214 See Paul C. Light, The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995 60–
65 (Yale 1997).
215 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report 411–15 (2004), archived at http://perma.cc/B2QX-V3H4.
216 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1011(a), Pub L No
108-458, 118 Stat 3638, 3648–50, codified at 50 USC § 3024(f).
217 Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal L Rev 1655, 1732–33 (2006).
218 See, for example, Huq, 100 Cal L Rev at 908 (cited in note 94).
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Implicit compensation in the form of policy discretion for bureaucrats works better with robust and enduring agencies than with
weak and transient agencies. All else being equal, officials exercising policy discretion as a form of implicit compensation thus
have good reason to identify with and promote their institution’s
persistence. There is a strong empirical connection between the
extent to which an institution is insulated from presidential
control and its durability.219 This suggests that an agency is less
likely to attract and cultivate expertise if it is under close presidential supervision because the marginal official will be uncertain whether any context-specific expertise they accrue will be
rendered valueless by the dissolution of the agency. Institutional
loyalty toward a specific agency or department—and hence to the
mission embodied in the statutes that agency is charged with
enforcing—is undermined by structural controls that increase a
president’s control and influence.220 The weaker presidential
removal authority, the more durable an agency and the more
likely its officials are to invest in expertise.
The second species of costly exit mechanism takes the form of
rules that inhibit or even bar exit, especially to positions that provide higher returns than continued government service. Officials
are more inclined to identify with their institutions if there is no
alternative career pathway, such that they are more likely to pursue a longer career within government. Lower returns from exit
can result if officials have institution-specific investments that
are not transferable either to another institution within government or to the private sector.221 Low returns to exit can also result
from formal, legal prohibitions to exit. We consider each of these
possibilities in turn.
Most obviously, institutional designers make exit costly by
simple prohibitions on the utilization of any capital obtained
while an official within an institution. More institution-specific
219 David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation
in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997 157–58 (Stanford 2003) (finding
that insulated agencies are substantially more durable than noninsulated agencies).
Lewis includes location outside the cabinet, specific qualifications for appointment, commission structure, and fixed terms as measures of political insulation. Id at 62–63.
220 The relationship between presidential control, in particular through the removal
power, and White House influence is, however, contingent and uncertain. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan L Rev 1, 24–52 (2013).
221 See Bertelli and Lewis, 23 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory at 224 (cited in note 206)
(“Our evidence suggests that acquiring [federal] agency-specific human capital—
knowledge and skills that are nontransferable to employers outside the agency—drives
down turnover intention.”).
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investments are encouraged, by contrast, when substantial
portions of capital obtained from working within the institution
cannot be monetized on departure. The Ethics Reform Act of
1989,222 for example, bars former members of Congress from lobbying for a year;223 a measure recently extended this prohibition
to two years for senators.224 Congress’s failure to bar lobbying of
agencies supervised by an individual legislator, however, may
render these prohibitions functionally ineffectual.225 On his first
day in office in 2009, President Obama issued an executive order
barring federal employees from a wide range of lobbying activities
for two years.226 The following year, he barred lobbyists from serving on federal boards.227 Such measures aim to gum up the
“revolving door” between government and the private sector.228
When successful, they lower the opportunity cost of remaining in
public service by lowering the expected payoffs of exit. When discarded, they diminish institutional allegiance in favor of baser
concerns.
The second mechanism is less obvious. It relies on a connection
between expertise acquisition and costly exit. Federal officials
develop institution-specific human capital by maintaining
responsibility for matters not routinely addressed by other public
or private institutions.229 The design of federal civil-service laws
often facilitates the acquisition of context-specific human capital
by employees, that is, expertise and knowledge tightly wound into
the specific aims and policy goals of their home agency. Civil servants generally do not enter their positions with the knowledge
and skills needed to pursue institutional goals. Even a system of
merit selection will not select for the “most meritorious” employees in the potential applicant pool unless the applicants “believe
222

Pub L No 101-194, 103 Stat 1716.
Ethics Reform Act § 101, 103 Stat at 1719, 18 USC § 207(e).
224 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 § 101, Pub L No 110-81, 121
Stat 735, 737–38. See also Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution,
64 Stan L Rev 191, 200–03 (2012).
225 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based,
Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 Ala L Rev 513, 532 n 86 (2007).
226 Executive Order 13490 § 2 (2010), 3 CFR 193, 198.
227 The White House, Lobbyists on Agency Boards and Commissions, 75 Fed Reg
35955, 35955 (2010).
228 Id.
229 See Bertelli and Lewis, 23 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory at 231 & n 11 (cited in
note 206) (noting that officials in the Department of Homeland Security and the National
Labor Relations Board self-reported the highest amount of institution-specific capital, and
officials in the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Education self-reported
the lowest amount).
223
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that their efforts and expertise will be applied to pursue goals”
that they share.230 Such expertise is often “relationship specific”
and “specifically tailored” to the operational environment and
goals of a particular agency.231 Tenure protection induces officials
to invest in that bespoke human capital.232 By inducing the acquisition of institution-specific expertise, the civil-service regime
thus helps create a cadre of officials whose professional standing,
and whose specific expertise, is tightly linked to the specific
agenda and policy goals of their institution. These officials are, all
else being equal, likely to rank the institution’s goals very high.
Consider, for instance, the Office of the Legal Adviser in the
Department of State, or “L,” an office renowned for the institutional orientation of its lawyers, even in comparison to some other
legal offices within the executive branch.233 Many attorneys there
work on matters of public international law, a field with little substantial presence in other parts of the federal government, state
governments, or the private sector. Lawyers in L also invest in
social networks related to public international law through organizations like the American Society for International Law. As we
explain below,234 this generates human capital within that office
that is not as easily transferable even compared to that acquired
in other forms of government legal service. The result is longer
tenures within L,235 and deeper identifications with that office and
the executive branch’s foreign policy missions more generally
than otherwise might be the case.236
Finally, the development of institution-specific human
capital helps elucidate why political appointees tend over time to
develop agency-level institutional loyalty that can overpower partisan loyalty. Presidential appointees rely on agency staff for

230 Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty, Learning while Governing: Expertise and
Accountability in the Executive Branch 130–31 (Chicago 2013).
231 Id at 33.
232 Gailmard and Patty, 51 Am J Polit Sci at 881 (cited in note 206).
233 See David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 Harv L Rev F 21, 40–41 (2012).
234 See text accompanying notes 270–73.
235 See Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight
Decades in Peace and War, 100 Georgetown L J 1747, 1749 (2012) (“[T]he heart of L has
been the dedicated career lawyers. . . . One measure of the relative importance of these
two sets of positions is that . . . the longest-serving Legal Adviser [ ] served fifteen years
. . . [b]ut many career attorneys . . . have served in L for years longer than that.”). See also
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 95–110 (Belknap 2010)
(discussing the OLC’s incentives).
236 Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 40–41 (cited in note 233).

2018]

Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law

51

knowledge and expertise on policy questions.237 By becoming
immersed in and acquainted with a complex body of rules, those
appointees also make personal investments in an epistemic
resource that is specific to a particular institution (the judiciary
or an agency).238 This asset-specific investment then ties the official’s interests to those of the agency in which he or she is embedded. As a result, political appointees have been known to defect
from the partisan or ideological agenda of the official’s putative
executive-branch sponsor.239
C.

Institutional Mandates

We turn next to the first of two ways in which constitutional
designers can take advantage of organizational socialization to
generate institutional loyalty. Unlike entrance and exit rules, organizational socialization operates as a “treatment effect” rather
than a selection effect.240 In the following two Sections, that is, we
are concerned with ways in which the design of an institution can
influence an individual’s perception of, and tendency to identify
with, her home institution. Our basic claim is that an institution’s
dominant architectural elements can elicit an internal culture in
which institutional loyalty will thrive.
We begin by isolating a simple element of institutional
design—institutional mandate—as a significant determinant of
institutional loyalty. The stronger an institution’s mandate, we
suggest, the more likely institutional loyalty will emerge. We then

237 David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the
Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J Reg 407, 431 (1997) (“[P]olitical scientists
have long noted as political appointees ‘grow’ into the role of agency head and acquire
additional expertise in the relevant policy arena, they often adopt the preferences and
perspectives of agency careerists on policy issues.”).
238 See, for example, Cornelius M. Kerwin and Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How
Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 129–64 (CQ 4th ed 2011) (discussing
complex and resource-intensive processes for creating and managing internal agency
rulemaking).
239 E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review under Executive
Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do about It, 57 L &
Contemp Probs 167, 176 (Spring 1994) (“[I]n most administrations, after a few years, the
OMB and White House ‘managers’ generally come to hold in contempt their erstwhile
colleagues in the agencies, believing that they have ‘gone native’ and adopted the characteristic values of their agencies.”).
240 See Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 953 (cited in note 25) (highlighting treatment effects
or “incentive-based” effects as those focused “on the creation of optimal incentives for those
who happen to occupy official posts at any given time”).
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explore how different design choices observed in either constitutional or statutory contexts either diminish or augment relevant
social networks.
1. Defining and cultivating institutional mandates.
Governmental institutions—whether a branch or an entity
within a branch—are typically understood by participants and
observers alike to have a set of purposes or functions. These constitute the institution’s mandate. An institution’s mandate need
not be articulated in a constitution or an organic statute, although
they often are. Institutional loyalty can be understood in terms of
officials’ endorsement of those purposes and functions into their
own preference sets.
An institutional mandate can be created by the constitutional
provision or statute that creates an institution. Alternatively, it
might be a result of policy entrepreneurship by agency leaders
with strong policy agendas.241 Institutional leadership can expend
resources priming new officials on the importance of particular
functions or aims. They can equip new appointees with the
epistemic resources and practical capability to understand and
execute a mandate. Even when not backed by such investments,
both written and informal mandates can serve as “focal points,”
helping to coordinate actors’ expectations and behavior in light of
some institutional ends and not others.242 Common knowledge of
the agency’s mandate, for instance, may provide a basis for coordination among officials who otherwise have little knowledge of
peers in physically remote offices or functionally separate divisions of the agency. Such coordination, Professors Tiberiu Dragu
and Mattias Polborn have recently demonstrated, is particularly
important in maintaining the rule of law against the efforts of

241 See Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations,
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 367 (Princeton 2001)
(“[B]ureaucratic power grew not at the expense of democratic participation but in a
symbiotic relationship with it. Precisely because federal agencies shrewdly orchestrated
the participatory energies of American politics, they cleared a unique policymaking place
for themselves in the American institutional order, at least for a time.”).
242 For an explanation of how focal points influence behavior absent sanctions, see
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and
Law, 82 S Cal L Rev 209, 233–34 (2009) (suggesting that a focal point can provide a salient
means for “individuals [to] coordinate in a particular way, and thereby create self-fulfilling
expectations that the recommended behavior will occur”).
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potentially autocratic leaders.243 When administrators expect
each other to resist unlawful policies, they show formally, legal
constraints on political leaders are more likely to be selfenforcing.244
Of importance to our analysis, an institution’s mandate need
not be unitary. By substantive command or via the imposition of
procedural obligations,245 an agency can be tasked with a plurality
of goals. There is not a sharp divide between unitary and plural
mandates, but rather a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, an
entity might be assigned a substantively narrow obligation that
requires little by way of discretionary judgment or expertise. The
institution’s objections also may be connected to official action by
a relatively short causal chain. A DMV tasked solely with examining potential drivers and distributing permits to them has
something of this character.
At the other end of the spectrum, an entity might have several, potentially conflicting goals that relate to official actions
through long and uncertain causal chains.246 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), for example, is “charged both with ensuring that new drugs placed on the market are safe and effective (a
task that generally requires cautious and deliberate action) and
with speedily granting access for doctors and patients to those
new, safe, and effective drugs (a task that requires expeditious
review of those drugs).”247 The FDA, when pursuing these conflicting mandates of safety and public health, necessarily makes
compromises between incommensurable ends.
The key point for (big-c or small-c) constitutional designers
is that the internal heterogeneity of an institutional mandate
influences the extent to which officials are likely, or even able, to
formulate institutional loyalty. The more plural and the more abstract an entity’s goals, the more disagreement there is likely to

243 Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn, The Administrative Foundation of the Rule of
Law, 75 J Polit 1038, 1047 (2013).
244 Id at 1040–44.
245 J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 Colum L Rev
2217, 2219 (2005) (noting the possibility of “substantive or procedural” mandates; the
latter “impose obligations to consider additional factors, perform a particular analysis, or
consult with specific players”).
246 Id at 2220 (“Congress can create the potential for interstatutory conflicts where
the agency must balance multiple and potentially competing obligations arising from different statutes usually passed at different times [b]y different enacting majorities.”).
247 Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 7 (2009).
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arise even among insiders about how best to carry out its mandate. In the stylized examples we have just offered, it is much
easier (and hence less costly) to discern the institutional mandate
for the DMV branch office than for the FDA. Entities with more
diverse institutional mandates, accordingly, are less likely to be
populated by officials with institutional loyalty than entities with
singular and unitary mandates.248
The effect of institutional architecture on mandates is evident both at a constitutional level and a statutory level. With the
Constitution, both single- and multiple-mandate branches can be
observed. Textualist constitutional scholars draw a distinction
between a “unitary” executive and the “plural” judiciary and
legislature.249 Although the force of this textual argument can be
disputed,250 the simple contrast between unitary and plural
branches plainly has some force. The relatively hierarchical structure of the executive juxtaposes with the relatively flat structure
of the legislative branch, in which each legislator’s vote formally
has the same weight within a given chambers. It is thus no surprise we commonly talk of the “Obama” or “Trump” presidency,
and not (usually) the Ryan/McConnell Congress.251 Those labels
suggest a widely shared belief that (1) there is a singular measure
of branch-level performance for Article II and (2) successes and
failures can be attached to a specific officeholder for the executive,
but not Congress.
248 Another factor that might sharpen the felt pull of an institutional mandate is the
degree to which an entity is the sole actor tasked with pursuing a policy goal. Congress,
for example, can task more than one agency with a policy goal as a way of stimulating
interagency competition. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J L &
Econ 617, 636–38 (1975). But it is far from clear whether a plurality of mandates will in
practice be successful in generating increased competition (and hence increased internalization of institutional aims), or whether it will induce a slackening of effort, if officials
believe that their role in the achievement of policy is no longer critical. See, for example,
Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 Duke L J 1415, 1462 (2012) (discussing this moral hazard problem in the national security context).
249 Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv L Rev 1153, 1179 (1992).
250 For objections to the centrality of the Constitution’s text more generally, see
Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1464–67 (cited in note 175).
251 Well, not always. See Thomas O. McGarity, Still Free to Harm: A Response to
Professor Farber, 92 Tex L Rev 1629, 1629 (2014) (speaking of the “104th (‘Gingrich’)
Congress”). This nomenclature, though, speaks to the extraordinary influence of thenSpeaker Newt Gingrich, as well as the extent of his ambitions at the time. It is also noteworthy that we refer seamlessly to the “Roberts Court” or the “Rehnquist Court,” despite
the “relative insignificance of the office” of chief justice. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr, The
Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized
Judicial Power, 89 Notre Dame L Rev 1021, 1024 (2014).
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Even if two institutions have the same functions, the way in
which they execute that function can influence the extent of relevant officials’ loyalty and zeal in pursuing that function. Consider
the distinct ways in which the executive and the legislative mediate political competition. The quadrennial presidential election
provides for the diachronic alteration of power between partisan
factions. Effectual political power under Article II comes in a
unitary package, which changes hands periodically. By contrast,
while Congress too has periodic elections, its plurality and heterogeneity invite an additional element of synchronic political
competition. The simultaneous possession of political power by
plural, adverse factions generates barriers to the identification of
a shared Article I mandate precisely because Congress folds in
partisan divisions in a way the White House does not. This is no
accident: the housing of political contestation is now recognized
as a central function of democratic legislatures.252 Hence, even
though Congress and the presidency have a similar democratic
mandate—channeling political conflict into formal, legal outcomes—differences in how that mandate is configured over time
radically influence their expected institutional loyalty.
Once more, it would be a mistake to think that the federal
constitution exhausts the range of possible configurations that
might elicit strong institutional mandates. Consider the possibility of a single-mission branch. Absent from our national organic
document, this idea is pursued with vigor at the state constitutional level. In that context, executive power is often “unbundled”
into mandate-specific offices, each of which is subject to separate
election.253 A majority of states thus directly elect an attorney
general, a lieutenant governor, and a secretary of state, as well as
a governor.254 This unbundling of functions into distinct executive
bodies will in expectation amplify institutional loyalty: for it is
much easier for an official within an unbundled executive to

252 Professor Jeremy Waldron has recently underscored the “institutional responsibility” of an opposition party to “oppose, to scrutinize the government, to hold them
accountable for their decisions.” Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: Essays on
Institutions 101 (Harvard 2016). Many constitutions outside the United States formalize
this role through what are termed “government in opposition rules.” David Fontana,
Government in Opposition, 119 Yale L J 548, 563 (2009). When those are adopted, we
suspect that institutional loyalty in the legislative branch is correspondingly more difficult
to get off the ground.
253 Gersen, 96 Va L Rev at 309–10 (cited in note 79).
254 Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U Chi L
Rev 1385, 1433 (2008) (documenting state-level practice).
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identify and align herself with a singular goal (for example, crime
control or the efficient provision of social services) than it is for
an official within a bundled executive to assemble an institutional
loyalty.
In the administrative-law context, in which both single- and
multiple-mandate agencies abound, there is ample anecdotal
evidence that single-mandate agencies tend to foster a “dedicated
but zealous” culture that is somewhat tone deaf to “the arguments
and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as well as in the
White House.”255 Hence, a quantitative study of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) elicited the view from within the agency
that EPA staff tend to be focused “narrowly on environmental
interests,” in contrast to the “broader perspective” taken by the
White House.256 Even multiple-mandate missions tend to focus on
one mission at the expense of others.257 Officials who favor the
losing mandate are hardly inclined to hew unreservedly to the
institution’s subsequent path. They are thus unlikely to evince
institutional loyalty to the same extent.
Finally, an institutional mandate may have a dynamic effect
on the selection into and out of the institution. If an institution is
renowned for its mandate, not only are officials with a prior
commitment to that mandate likely to select in, but also, once
embedded in the institution, they are more likely to make nontransferable mandate-specific investments in expertise. This
makes exit costlier. For example, if the EPA is known to maintain
a commitment to combating climate change, rather than fostering
polluting industries, it will be less likely to attract staff who are
climate change skeptics.258 And vice versa. Officials hired will then
redouble their epistemic investments to make the EPA’s mission
(however conceived) a success. The result is a positive-feedback
255

Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298, 406 (DC Cir 1981).
Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich L Rev 47, 89 (2006).
257 See, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias
and the Department of Justice, 99 Va L Rev 271, 312 (2013) (finding that in the Justice
Department, “the law enforcement mission will trump all others”); DeShazo and Freeman,
105 Colum L Rev at 2221 (cited in note 245).
258 There is also an ideological dimension to this dynamic. A mandate for a part of the
federal government to do something can generate progovernmental loyalty that makes
federal agents themselves more likely to select for and generate incentives toward liberal
worldviews. See, for example, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, Clashing Beliefs
within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy, 70 Am Polit Sci Rev
456, 466–68 (1976); Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, The Political Views of U.S.
Senior Federal Executives, 1970–1992, 57 J Polit 838, 842–49 (1995).
256
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mechanism by which the strength of an institutional mandate
increases over time.
In summary, how institutions are sliced up, whether by function or by subject matter, directly shapes the extent to which their
officials tend to develop institutional loyalty. Insulation from
synchronic partisan conflict, pursuit of an indivisible mission, and
the elimination of plural conflicting mandates—all these are
likely to conduce to sharper institutional loyalty.
2. Diluting institutional mandates.
Cultivating an institutional mandate, however, is not costless. The channeling of political conflict into a single legislative
forum, for example, is a central element of constitutional design.259 Even if Congress is, as a result of playing this function,
unable to muster the same level of institutional loyalty as the
executive, its role as a forum for routine partisan contestation is
sufficiently important not to be derogated. There are a number of
other design elements, however, that fragment institutional mandates and so undermine institutional loyalty in pursuit of other
public values. The resulting trade-offs have not yet been identified. We consider the interaction of mandates with the “internal
separation of powers”260 to illustrate such conflicts.
Skepticism about the constraining effect of the separation of
powers has induced some scholars to advocate alternatively for
an “internal” separation of powers.261 The idea of an internal
separation of power has an oxymoronic aspect. One prominent
commentator suggests that they can be understood as mechanisms
that “seek to achieve [the interbranch separation of powers’] goals
by operating within the confines of a single branch.”262 Leading
examples include the separation of adjudication from rulemaking
or prosecutorial functions within administrative agencies, and

259 Ginsburg and Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance at 18–20 (cited in note 26)
(defining constitutional performance by the extent to which quotidian political conflict is
channeled in nonviolent, discursive forums, among other goals).
260 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 426–29 (2009); Katyal, 115
Yale L J at 2319–25 (cited in note 6).
261 See Metzger, 59 Emory L J at 427–37 (cited in note 260) (describing examples of
administrative structures that operate as an “internal” separation of powers); Katyal, 115
Yale L J at 2316–25 (cited in note 6) (advocating greater internal separation of powers in
the face of increasing congressional abdication).
262 Metzger, 59 Emory L J at 427–28 (cited in note 260).
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the creation of “independent” agencies that exercise a measure of
policy discretion free of presidential control.263
Whether or not these design elements have independent justifications,264 it seems likely that their installation would dilute
branch-level (and sometimes agency-level) institutional loyalty.
Functional or policy mission–based distinctions within a branch
foster plural, rather than unitary, understandings of a branch’s
mandate. The very function of independent agencies, such as the
Federal Reserve, is to create acoustic separation between shortterm partisan interests and longer-term systemic goals.265 Similarly, “dissent channels,” which allow career bureaucrats to voice
frustrations about an administration’s policy and which have also
been championed as form of internal separation of powers, might
have benefits in defeating groupthink.266 But because they have
costs in terms of diluting institutional loyalty at the level of the
branch, there is a trade-off between fostering loyalty to the
branch as opposed to a subunit, such as an agency.
Consider by way of example the decision of career diplomats
within the State Department recently to use a dissent channel to
challenge the Obama White House’s limited military deployment
in the Syrian conflict.267 Their memorandum aired, and hence
likely compounded, “deep rifts and lingering frustration” within
the executive branch.268 The mere availability of a dissent channel
undercuts pressure toward conformity on a single executivebranch position.269 It hence acts as a friction on the formation of
executive-oriented institutional loyalty.

263

Id at 429–30.
See Posner and Vermeule, 74 U Chi L Rev at 898 (cited in note 89) (arguing that
an internal separation-of-powers proposal is “self-defeating”).
265 The Federal Reserve’s relationship to the White House is rather more complicated
than the conventional story would suggest. See George A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy
Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences, 38 Am J Polit Sci 124, 135–40
(1994) (finding “significant evidence for presidential influence on consensual decision
making” by the Reserve’s Board of Governors).
266 See, for example, Katyal, 115 Yale L J at 2328–29 (cited in note 6).
267 Mark Landler, 51 US Diplomats, in Dissent, Urge Strikes on Assad (NY Times,
June 16, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/syria-assad
-obama-airstrikes-diplomats-memo.html (visited Oct 28, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
268 Id.
269 For example, the Syria dissent did not address the potential costs and risks of
state collapse in Syria, a risk the US military prioritized. See id.
264
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D. Social Networks
Institutional loyalty is generated when officials are part of
“social networks”270 that generate and reinforce commitments to
an institution. That social networks influence the behavior and
preferences of political officials and citizens is now “well established empirically.”271 This is because “[p]eople frequently think
and do what they think and do because of what they think relevant others think and do.”272 This Section renders this intuition
in slightly more formal terms, and integrates it with the literature
on constitutional design, which has largely ignored the topic.273
The social networks of government officials influence behavior
and preferences through at least two pathways. First, networks
shape the “epistemic community”274 in which officials operate.275
Social networks help define the “argument pools” to which officials are exposed.276 Information diffuses quickly through social
networks. The stronger the network, the faster the information
diffuses, and the stronger its influence on argument pools.277

270 See Betsy Sinclair, The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior xi
(Chicago 2012) (defining a social network as “the complex collection of relationships that
arise from each person’s geography, work, and leisure activities”).
271 James H. Fowler, et al, Causality in Political Networks, 39 Am Polit Rsrch 437,
438 (2011). See also David A. Siegel, Social Networks and Collective Action, 53 Am J Polit
Sci 122, 122 (2009) (“Across social science, a wealth of empirical evidence illustrates the
ways in which social interactions can alter choice.”).
272 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L J
71, 77 (2000).
273 For an exception, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 Yale L J 1256, 1271 (2009) (discussing social networks in the cooperative
federalism context).
274 For applications to government, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 Yale L J 2599, 2648 (1997); Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 Intl Org 1, 4 (1992).
275 See, for example, Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 42 (1983).
276 See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads,
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J Polit Economy
992, 995 (1992) (explaining the implications of limited argument pools). See also Timur
Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan L Rev
683, 715–35 (1999) (discussing how limited argument pools shape preferences).
277 By the “strength” of a network, we mean a number of variables that characterize
relationships. See Daniel J. Brass, Kenneth D. Butterfield, and Bruce C. Skaggs, Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network Perspective, 23 Acad Mgmt Rev 14,
17 (1998) (“The strength of a relationship refers to the frequency, reciprocity, emotional
intensity, and intimacy of that relationship. Casual acquaintances, represented by infrequent interaction and indifferent affect, are characterized by weak ties.”) (citation omitted).
Information traveling between stronger ties is more likely to be duplicative. See Mark
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 Sociological Theory
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Empirical studies of official behavior thus identify strong “peer
effects” by which “bureaucrats’ responses to uncertainty turn less
on supervisory instructions and more upon what they perceive
peer bureaucrats to be doing.”278
Second, internal social networks generate reputational costs
for officials straying from an institutional orthodoxy. Networks
reduce monitoring costs. It is cheaper to obtain and evaluate information about close colleagues or friends. These networks have
proven important. The leading study of bureaucratic autonomy,
by Professor Daniel Carpenter, identified such social networks as
a critical tool for professional administrators, who used their
alternative power base “in political and social networks” to reduce
“their dependence on elected officials.”279 Social networks thus
provide a way of collectively amassing and exercising power on
something other than an ideological or partisan basis. In the early
Republic, Chief Justice Marshall showed a canny awareness of
that possibility by insisting that the justices all reside together in
a boardinghouse. Marshall aimed “to use the camaraderie of
boarding-house life to dispel dissent and achieve a one-voiced
Opinion of the Court.”280
With these mechanisms in hand, it is possible to pick out a
number of ways in which institutional designers exploit or resist
social networks to generate institutional loyalties. To begin with,
numerous constitutional rules, conventions, and statutory rules
are usefully understood as efforts to cultivate intra-institutional
networks and tamp down on cross-institutional networks. The
Incompatibility Clause of Article I, for example, states that “[N]o
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”281 As
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 76, if legislators were serving in the
executive branch, there would be a constant source of “executive
201, 204 (1983); Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow
of Information and Influence, 5 Soc Networks 245, 260–63 (1983).
278 Huq, 65 Stan L Rev at 48 (cited in note 220), citing John Brehm and Scott Gates,
Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public 73–74
(1997). See also Damon Centola, The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network
Experiment, 329 Science 1194, 1197 (2010) (“Whereas locally clustered ties may be redundant for simple contagions, like information or disease, they can be highly efficient for
promoting behavioral diffusion.”) (citations omitted).
279 Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy at 15 (cited in note 241).
280 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 Sw U L Rev 189,
191 (2003). Marshall also provided his colleagues with port and madeira, which cannot have
hurt his cause. Id.
281 US Const Art I, § 6, cl 2.
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influence upon the legislative body.”282 Analogously, the Supreme
Court has recently implied that the Due Process Clause bars state
and federal judges alike from deciding cases under the excessive
influence of either legislative- or executive-branch actors.283
Textual anti-networking rules are supplemented by weaker
conventions.284 When Justice Abe Fortas was nominated to become chief justice, he was defeated in part because of revelations
of his close relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson.285
This generated an informal convention against the justices being
an essential and close part of the network of senior officials within
the other branches of government, motivated in part by a concern
that such ties would compromise the institutional loyalty of the
justices.286 This convention, though, is not as strong as a constitutional rule. Hence, in 2004, when Vice President Cheney went
hunting with Justice Scalia even as a case denominated with his
name was before the Court, loud objections were raised by commentators287 and by litigants.288 In contrast to Fortas, however,
Scalia publicly defended his decision not to recuse himself by
pointing out the mundaneness of cross-branch social networking.
“Social contacts with high-level executive officials (including
cabinet officers),” he explained in a letter to the Los Angeles
Times, “have never been thought improper for judges who may
have before them cases in which those people are involved in their
official capacity, as opposed to their personal capacity.”289 It may
282

Federalist 76 at 514 (cited in note 185).
See Williams v Pennsylvania, 136 S Ct 1899, 1905 (2016) (“The Court now holds
that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a
judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision
regarding the defendant’s case.”). See also In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955) (“A
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
284 For a definition and discussion of conventions, see Adrian Vermeule, Conventions
of Agency Independence, 113 Colum L Rev 1163, 1166, 1181–94 (2013) (“[U]nwritten political norms within relevant legal and political communities impose sanctions for perceived
violations of agency independence or create internalized values or beliefs.”).
285 Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography 337–55 (Yale 1990).
286 See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Legacy of Chief Justice Fortas, 18 Green Bag 2d 261,
261 (2015) (“Nonetheless, Fortas’s defeat was a watershed that redefined the norms governing how the Justices interact with the White House and relate to presidential politics.”).
287 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to
Judicial Recusal, 53 U Kan L Rev 531, 573 n 205 (2005) (collecting examples). For the case
in question, see generally Cheney v United States District Court for District of Columbia,
542 US 367 (2004).
288 See generally Cheney v United States District Court for District of Columbia, 541
US 913 (2004) (regarding motion to recuse Scalia).
289 David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia: Friends Hunt
Ducks Together, Even as the Justice Is Set to Hear the Vice President’s Case (LA Times,
283
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well be that this successful defense has eroded the post-Fortas
convention somewhat.
Consonant with Scalia’s defense, there are many ways in
which the Constitution remains open to interbranch networks.
For example, there is no Due Process Clause bar to executive or
legislative influence on a coordinate political branch.290 If anything, the Framers seemed more concerned about preventing officials sharing social networks with those in power in state governments than preventing officials sharing social networks with
those in other branches of the federal government. The creation
of a new national capital beyond the control of state governments,
for example, was meant to prevent federal officials from becoming
too intertwined with state officials.291
Other constitutional rules generate social networks that
reinforce rather than reduce institutional loyalty. Providing the
heads of institutions with strong control over their institutions
can lead them to surround themselves with members of their social
networks.292 Consider again Cheney’s defense of a unitary and powerful executive branch.293 Cheney himself wielded unprecedented
control over the operations of the Office of the Vice President,
using this power to surround himself with friends and allies.294
This personnel-related authority allowed him to translate ideas
diffusing through his external social network about the merits of
Jan 17, 2004), online at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/17/nation/na-ducks17 (visited
Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
290 We have almost nothing like a “due process of lawmaking.” See generally Hans A.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb L Rev 197 (1976). At the agency level, though,
doctrines governing formal adjudications and notice and comment provide something at
least comparable to due process for most executive actions. Kevin M. Stack, Agency
Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking Form, 2009 Mich St L Rev 225, 234 (“[A] legality principle associated with due process imposes . . . constraint[s] on the considerations
an agency may take into account in formal adjudication [and] in notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”).
291 Federalist 43 (Madison), in The Federalist 288, 289 (cited in note 3):
Without [exclusive jurisdiction at the capital], not only the public authority
might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted, with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the general Government, on the State comprehending
the seat of government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring
on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable
to the Government, and dissatisfactory to other members of the confederacy.
292 See Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather:
Homophily in Social Networks, 27 Ann Rev Sociology 415, 435 (2001).
293 See notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
294 See Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency, 38 Pres
Stud Q 374, 384–87 (2008) (discussing Cheney’s institutional claims and central role in
staffing the administration).
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a powerful executive295 into institutional practice operationalized
through an internal network of fellow travelers.296 External social
networks, including law professors and other legal experts,
helped aggrandize the branch’s authority.
Institutions can also be part of wider professional social networks that cut across the public–private divide, and that police
adherence to institutional norms while at the same time providing legitimation and public support. Elements of the “thick political surround” can also feature institution-specific investments
that would be endangered by official behavior that defies loyalty.
Because officials are networked with these actors, they are
exposed to pressure to conform to institutional norms, but also
benefit from an extraneous source of political capital.
Such networks are particularly robust in respect to the
Article III judiciary; they help explain one of our motivating
examples, Roberts’s decisive vote in NFIB.297 The chief justice,
and the Court as a whole, is embedded in a larger social network
of commentators, think tanks, scholars, and lawyers, largely
located inside the Beltway.298 This network has been reinforced by
the recent development of a powerful “Supreme Court Bar”
comprising many leading national law firms.299 This diffuse network is an important source of criticism, and hence social pressure toward certain sorts of institutional behavior, sometimes
epitomized (or caricatured) as the so-called “Greenhouse effect.”
This is the alleged phenomenon “in which some Supreme Court
Justices have drifted away from the conservatism of their early
votes . . . towards the stated preferences of cultural elites, including left-leaning journalists and the ‘liberal legal establishment
that dominates at elite law schools.’” 300 Although this purported
295 For the history of the unitary executive, see generally Amanda Hollis-Brusky,
Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual Investment in the Unitary
Executive Theory, 1981–2000, 89 Denver U L Rev 197 (2011). See also Stephen Skowronek,
The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the
Unitary Executive, 122 Harv L Rev 2070, 2096–2103 (2009).
296 See Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency at 156 (cited in note 113) (discussing long-term social and professional connections between Cheney and his staff).
297 See text accompanying notes 11–13.
298 See Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares about Elites,
Not the American People, 98 Georgetown L J 1515, 1537–44 (2010) (documenting elite
influences on the Court).
299 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1491–1502 (2008).
300 Baum and Devins, 98 Georgetown L J at 1518 (cited in note 298), quoting Evan
Thomas and Stuart Taylor Jr, O’Connor’s Rightful Heir? (Newsweek, Jan 30, 2006), archived
at http://perma.cc/EQ3Y-5YA8.
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dynamic has a partisan flavor at present (at least in the accounts
that circulate in the media), it is also possible that the justices’
integration into this network reinforces professional norms respecting legal craft and precision in ways that are nonideological
in character.
This social network also provides an important source of validation and political support for the Court as an institution. The
Court derives legitimacy and strength from this network—from
the commentators on the left and right who routinely identify the
Court as a vital national institution, from the many elite law
firms that rely on it for prestige (and even business), and from the
media that pay obsessive attention to the justices and their
doings. In short, the Court’s social network provides ballast that
both strengthens and also roots it to particular institutional
practices and norms.
***
To summarize, some basic architectural choices about how
branches and agencies are set up strongly shape the possibility of
institutional loyalty. As we explore further below, institutional
loyalty may or may not be desirable. To the extent it is thought
desirable, though, the design decisions that conduce to shared
institutional mandates should take it into consideration.
III. RECALIBRATING INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTIES
We shift in this Part from description and analysis to a more
normative stance. Having isolated the nature and importance of
institutional loyalties, and their causal origins, we consider how
individual officials’ loyalty within each branch might be usefully
recalibrated. Our aim in this Part is to be illustrative, offering
suggestions, rather than firm or final diagnoses. We hope to
demonstrate that the recalibration of institutional loyalty is a valuable, yet to date underappreciated, mechanism for attaining
larger constitutional goals.
A measure of caution is counseled by the background complexity of the separation of powers. That constitutional tradition
is animated by multiple normative ambitions, including liberty,
democratic accountability, and rule-of-law promotion.301 These

301 Huq and Michaels, 126 Yale L J at 382–91 (cited in note 26) (analyzing the multiplicity of goals in the separation-of-powers context).
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goals can and do clash.302 We do not aim to settle the profound
normative questions of how to optimize these goals over competing constitutional ends across different contexts here. Nor do we
tackle in this Article the difficult questions of which kinds of
branch-level reforms are incentive compatible.303 Because our
ambition here is to show the conceptual utility of institutional
loyalty, we will put to one side process-related questions of how
one gets from “here to there.”304 In short, the branch-by-branch
illustrations of pathways for institutional reform that we offer below should be taken as a “proof of concept,” not a strict agenda for
institutional reform.
Our analysis, moreover, makes no strong assumptions about
the motives of an institutional designer. This raises an important
criticism: Are we answering the question of how institutional
dispositions arise by simply shifting the problem from the level of
design to designer? What good does the identification of a toolkit
do if adequate motivational foundations for designers are
unavailable? There are, in fact, several reasons why institutional
designers have good cause to consider how their choices influence
officials’ dispositions. Most importantly, most designers want
their institutional progeny to succeed. Official dispositions keyed
to a particular institution are often necessary to the latter’s
successful operation. Explaining the importance of a shared
“corporate culture” among managers, Professor David Kreps has
pointed out that culture furnishes focal points for the resolution
of unexpected contingencies “in the minds of its hierarchical inferiors.”305 Investment in a joint (institutional) project also means

302

Id at 382.
See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits
of Impartiality, 122 Yale L J 384, 397 (2012) (noting the difficulty of legislative redistricting proposals that are incentive incompatible because their implementation is blocked by
the very problem of legislative entrenchment they aim to cure). But see Heather K.
Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol
1, 6–12 (2010) (suggesting pathways around this incentive incompatibility problem). There
is a sense in which incentive-incompatibility objections are often better understood as failures of political imagination.
304 Gerken, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 5 (cited in note 303). In any case, legal
scholars are not necessarily in the best position to judge the political feasibility of a specific
proposal. See generally, for example, Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv L Rev 1593 (2014).
305 David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in James E. Alt and
Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 93 (Cambridge 1990).
303
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that external actors can confidently develop “stable expectations”
about institutions’ likely behavior.306
In addressing the utility of reforms that leverage institutional
loyalty for each branch in turn, we begin by offering a hypothesis
as to whether the branch is appropriately characterized by excessive or insufficient incentives to heed the branch’s interests. We
recognize that these baselines are controversial. Our purpose in
specifying them, however, is to facilitate an analysis of the feasible
design margins that can be recalibrated to generate institutional
loyalties. Readers with a different normative prior should therefore attend to the lessons for institutional design, rather than our
stipulated baselines. Having set a (provisional) normative baseline, we then work from the causal pathways identified in Part II
to recommendations for how the surfeit or deficiency of institutional loyalty respectively might be mitigated.
A.

The Executive Branch’s Incentives Refocused

Today, the executive branch exercises extensive policy authority regardless of the party or the president in power.307 This
authority is mediated through entities, such as the National
Security Council and the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, that are able to cultivate high degrees of institutional loyalty via selective entrance rules, a complex civil-service regime,
and the existence of durable career paths wholly within the
federal government. The net result is that high-level executive
personnel are generally characterized to a far greater degree by
institutional loyalty relative to their congressional analogs.
Hence, Article II–related loyalties are in no immediate risk of being crowded out entirely by partisan or ideological loyalty. If they
are threatened at all, it is by loyalties to more granular units,
such as departments and agencies.308
We assume an executive characterized by strong institutional
loyalty toward the branch as a whole, and even stronger loyalties
to agencies and departments. Given this rough baseline, we

306 Russell Hardin, Trust 147 (Polity 2006). See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 134–35 (Harvard 1960) (“Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity
of the relation between parties.”).
307 See, for example, Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Presidential Power:
Unchecked and Unbalanced 11 (Norton 2007) (“Sometime in the second half of the twentieth century, the president moved into the driver’s seat of our political system.”).
308 See text accompanying notes 229–31 (discussing the costs of excessive focus on a
single agency’s mission).
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consider how institutional loyalties might be refocused toward
the branch, rather than the agency or department, level, and,
alternatively, how more government-wide preferences might be
cultivated. We examine closely the merits of expanding on the
rotation system that authorizes executive-branch officials to work
outside of their usual institutional setting for a period of time.309
Job responsibilities for all employees, including those in the
executive branch, can be sliced and allocated using many different tools. Executive-branch responsibilities can be bundled into
permanent parcels (called “portfolios” in Washington speak) that
are assigned to particular executive-branch officials. This is the
normal practice in the executive branch, in which officials work for
many years in the same offices with roughly the same portfolios—
with small exceptions.310 Civil servants in the executive branch
tend to be promoted within the same agency or department in the
executive branch, rather than moving between them. Political
appointees tend to go “in and out” of the executive branch, rather
than moving between agencies or departments within the executive branch.311 All this entrenches agency-level loyalties.
In contrast, rotations within the executive branch mitigate
loyalties that stop at the agency or department door. Federal law
now recognizes executive job rotations but imposes numerous limitations on them.312 The most reliable data produced by the federal
government has also found a very small number of “detailees,”313
the technical term for those detailed to another part of the executive branch or another branch entirely.314 The alumni of these
rotations are not only likely to generate complicated institutional
loyalties, but also to be effective in pursuing those complicated
309 See, for example, DAO 202-334: Details (Office of Privacy and Open Government,
June 22, 1971), archived at http://perma.cc/JK64-M2XZ (discussing the terms and operation of detailing within the Commerce Department).
310 See Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments at 47–48 (cited in note 196).
311 See Carl Brauer, Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment Employment Trends of
Presidential Appointees, in G. Calvin Mackenzie, ed, The In-and-Outers: Presidential
Appointees and Transient Government in Washington 174, 182 (Johns Hopkins 1987)
(“[T]he general rule among presidential appointees is ‘in and out and never in again.’”).
312 See, for example, 2 USC § 4301(f) (listing “[l]imitations” on those “detailed or
assigned” from the executive branch to the legislative branch); 3 USC § 113(b)(4) (requiring that the president annually report to Congress on the usage of detailees).
313 US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Human
Resources, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives: Personnel
Practices: Schedule C and Other Details to the Executive Office of the President *3 (Nov
1992), archived at http://perma.cc/YZW5-J46N (finding anywhere from 115 to 342 detailees
to high-level executive-branch positions during different calendar years).
314 Id at *27.
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loyalties. A number of empirical studies suggest that accrual of
“specific human capital” in the form of relationships with other
officials predicts “effectiveness in office.”315
Job rotations within and between branches expand loyalties
to the branch by leveraging several of the mechanisms identified
in Part II. Entrance mechanisms, for example, can select for the
detailees most likely to generate and manage loyalties to both
their home and detailed institution. Detailees can be assigned to
a new institution only if their home institution—usually at the
highest level—agrees that a temporary assignment would be useful
after the detailee returns.316 The new, temporary institutional employer must also approve the detailee, and sometimes must pay
them out of their limited budget.317 These entrance mechanisms
are essentially screening tools to identify those capable of the
more complicated institutional loyalties that flow from detailing.
An alternative approach is to vary employee assignments across
time. Temporary task bundling (also known as “job rotation”318 or
using a “Type Z organization”319) means assigning officials for
short periods of time to distinct tasks.320 These distinct and

315 Sarah A. Binder and Frances E. Lee, Making Deals in Congress, in Nathaniel
Persily, ed, Solutions to Political Polarization in America 240, 255 (Cambridge 2015).
316 See, for example, 3 USC § 112 (providing that for intra-executive detailees to the
“White House Office, the Executive Residence at the White House, the Office of the Vice
President, the Domestic Policy Staff, and the Office of Administration,” the new institution
“shall reimburse the detailing department, agency, or establishment”); US Department of
Homeland Security, Coast Guard Division, Commandant Instruction 5703.3 *2 (Apr 18,
2003), archived at http://perma.cc/N8AB-HML4 (“[C]ongressional detail provisions shall
be approved by the Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard based on the recommendation of
the Assistant Commandant for Governmental and Public Affairs developed in consultation
with the Chief, Office of Congressional Affairs.”).
317 See Judicial Watch, Inc v Department of Energy, 412 F3d 125, 132 (DC Cir 2005).
318 Metin M. Coşgel and Thomas J. Miceli, Job Rotation: Cost, Benefits, and Stylized
Facts, 155 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 301, 301 (1999) (describing job rotations as not assigning each worker “to a single and specific task but [instead] to a set of several tasks
among which he or she rotates with some frequency”).
319 William G. Ouchi, Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese
Challenge 32 (Addison-Wesley 1981) (“[L]ifelong job rotation [means] . . . a technician may
work on a different machine or in a different division every few years, and all managers
will rotate through all areas of the business.”).
320 This is sometimes called “job enlargement” in the labor economics literature.
Eaton H. Conant and Maurice D. Kilbridge, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Job Enlargement: Technology, Costs, and Behavioral Implications, 18 Indust & Labor Rel Rev 377, 377
(1965) (describing this as “the practice of restoring to jobs some of the skill, responsibility,
and variety that have been lost through work simplification”).
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temporary tasks can be allocated to officials while these officials
remain in their current positions.321
Exit mechanisms can also encourage asset-specific investments in the home institution of the detailee, as well as in the
potential future or actual present institution to which the official
is detailed. Detailees invest in their home institution because
they have a position there. Investing in that position will yield
continued and potentially improved employment prospects there
in the future. The cost of exiting a home institution, though, is
mitigated by job rotations. Rotation creates new social networks
and employment opportunities, mitigating the costs of exiting a
home institution. Once a detail is arranged, moreover, the actual
experience of working in a new institutional setting makes the
possibility of exit more concrete, and hence less costly.
The social context of the detailee is also transformed by their
temporary assignment. There is a strong relationship between
those with whom officials work and those who are the strongest
nodes in their social networks.322 After a civil servant works for
years for an executive-branch agency or department, these connections within their agency or department can become even
stronger. Political appointees, for instance, receive their executivebranch positions because of their ties to other political elites who
have been, are, or will be political appointees.323
Rotations mean that networks are expanded to include those
outside of their home institution. Upon returning to their home
institutions, detailees are likely to have internalized many of the
perspectives of the officials they added to their network from their

321 An example, by way of analogy, is found in L, which is the State Department Legal
Adviser’s Office. L requires lawyers to rotate among issue divisions within that office.
Lawyers might work first on a narrow question of international environmental law of
concern to few within the executive branch, but then develop knowledge of international
commercial arbitration, gaining expertise in a new issue and exposure to a distinct socialnetwork-sector salience. See Koh, 100 Georgetown L J at 1773 (cited in note 235) (“[O]ur
[office’s] system of attorney rotation, which keeps lawyers in L for long tenures while
allowing them to work on an ever-expanding set of issues, thus avoid[s] intellectual calcification while maintaining institutional continuity and knowledge.”).
322 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 27 Ann Rev Sociology at 426–27, 431
(cited in note 292). See also Jone L. Pearce and Amy E. Randel, Expectations of Organizational Mobility, Workplace Social Inclusion, and Employee Job Performance, 25 J Org Behav
81, 86 (2004) (arguing that social inclusion in the workplace has a positive relationship to
individual workplace performance).
323 See Gabriel Horton and David E. Lewis, Turkey Farms, Patronage, and Obama
Administration Appointments *20–28 (Vanderbilt Public Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No 09-19, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/A73K-2VUS.
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temporary institutional homes. Scholars of employees in the public sector have often found that “employees adapt their behavior
consistent with the norms and expectations of people around
them,”324 in “profound” and persistent ways.325 Going forward,
newly networked officials become regular parts of the personal
and professional network of the detailed official, generating loyalties to their temporary institutional home even after an official
returns home.
Job rotations within the executive branch can therefore be a
tool used by those arguing for the need for a more holistic Article II
perspective. The OLC, for instance, has been criticized by scholars
like Professor Bruce Ackerman for being unduly loyal to the
power of the president.326 OLC lawyers tend to move to other
positions outside of the executive branch, such as becoming law
professors, or move into the White House.327 An OLC lawyer who
spent months working for the equally elite Office of the Legal
Advisor in the Department of State might for instance be less
skeptical of international-law constraints on presidential
power.328
Reformers could also use rotations to dilute an Article II orientation. Executive-branch officials can be temporarily detailed
to another executive-branch agency or department, or even to the
legislative or judicial branch. Job rotations from the executive
branch to the other branches in particular sensitize the executive
branch to the legislative and judicial branches. The executive branch
dominates the federal government, with more than 2.6 million
employees.329 It should not be surprising that it is quite common
in Washington to find executive-branch officials sharing social
networks with entirely or almost entirely other executive-branch

324 Donald P. Moynihan and Sanjay K. Pandey, The Ties That Bind: Social Networks,
Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention, 18 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory
205, 210 (2007).
325 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes
in Administrative Organization xvi (Free Press 3d ed 1976).
326 See Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic at 152 (cited in note
235) (describing the “lawlessness” generated by OLC deference to presidential priorities).
327 See id at 97; Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 25–27 (cited in note 233).
328 See Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 40–41 (cited in note 233).
329 See US Office of Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics:
The Fact Book *8 (2007), archived at http://perma.cc/TG6A-3JZS.
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officials330—they are the overwhelming majority of officials living
in Washington, after all. If officials are working on more, and
more varied, issues, they are more likely to build more heterogeneous social networks that incorporate Congress, the federal
courts, and even the private sector. These wider social networks
may deflate past institutional loyalties not only because they
change officials’ sources for information, but also because they
serve as pathways to alternative, nonexecutive positions.
There is evidence that earlier professional experiences in
another branch of government generate loyalties to that branch
that endure even after an official has moved on to another branch.
Empirical studies have found, for instance, that federal judges are
more likely to rule in favor of the executive branch if they have
served in the executive branch earlier in their careers.331 Courts
have also noted the complex loyalties held by those who have
moved offices, characterizing such personnel as a blend of employees of their old institutions, employees of their new institutions,
and independent contractors.332 There is every reason to believe
that a recent job rotation would have roughly the same—or
greater—loyalty-generating power as a professional experience
decades earlier would have. The OLC lawyer who spends several
months working for the Senate Judiciary Committee would have
a different sense of presidential power than the OLC lawyer who
never left the executive branch.333

330 See generally Ashley Parker, All the Obama 20-Somethings (NY Times, Apr 29,
2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/magazine/02obamastaff-t.html (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (reporting on several apartments and
homes in Washington shared by high-level Obama administration officials).
331 See Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some
Republican Supreme Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 457,
459–66 (2007); Rob Robinson, Executive Branch Socialization and Deference on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 46 L & Society Rev 889, 907–13 (2012).
332 See, for example, Judicial Watch, 412 F3d at 131–32:

Although the district court acknowledged that, during their detail, the employees worked exclusively on NEPDG matters, were supervised by the Office of the
Vice President, and did not occupy an office at the DOE, it appeared not to consider those factors in deciding whether the detailees remained DOE employees;
instead the district court appeared to rely solely upon the agency having paid
their salaries.
See also Schedule C and Other Details to the Executive Office of the President at *10–17
(cited in note 313) (noting various factors to consider in evaluating whether a detailee
works for a past or current institution).
333 Variation in institutional experience of this kind, indeed, might be made an informal criterion for hiring to the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to promote
a bench without asymmetrical sympathies.
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Job rotations across branches, though, are rare. When they
do happen, detailee traffic tends to be from the legislature (and
sometimes the courts) to the executive—and rarely the other way
around. Federal law authorizes detailing of executive-branch
officials to House or Senate committees, but does not do the same
for the personal staffs of members of the House or Senate.334 The
relatively formidable power of the modern executive branch means
that the attraction of working in the executive branch is substantial. The polarized and despised Congress has a harder time attracting talented staffers.335 Job rotations across branches right now,
therefore, might well serve to spread the gospel about the importance of executive-branch loyalty, rather than tempering it.336
B.

Judicial Ambition and the Rule of Law

Institutional loyalties within the federal judiciary might be
supposed an unfettered good insofar as they conduce toward
“judicial independence” from the Congress and the executive
branch.337 The implicit assumption of this view is that by negating
the influence of coordinate branches, structural protections of
judicial independence enable judges to exercise their independent
judgment about what law (and law alone) requires. But this need
not be so. Over the course of the twentieth century, the federal
judiciary developed an unprecedented institutional heft and has
successfully secured “important authority over key jurisdictional
and administrative powers.”338 In a vivid display of an institutional loyalty at work early in the twentieth century, Chief Justice
William Howard Taft extensively lobbied Congress on behalf of

334 See 2 USC § 4301(f). See also Members’ Handbook and Committees’ Handbook,
Detailees (House Administration, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM8H-JAJQ.
335 See Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, A New Agenda for Political Reform (Wash
Monthly, Mar 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GK37-GLLV (“The federal government
across all its branches has experienced a deterioration in its ability to acquire, process,
and analyze information. But the problem is especially urgent in Congress, which is at the
center of America’s current governing crisis.”).
336 See Detail Opportunity: OIRA’s Regulatory Exchange and Training Program
(OMB), archived at http://perma.cc/CL6Q-DB8Y (“The purpose of this program is to help
develop a cadre of agency experts in Executive Order regulatory review and planning, and
to foster better cooperation among the agencies and OMB.”).
337 See Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 222 (1995) (“[T]he need for separation of legislative from judicial power was plain [to the Framers].”); Northern Pipeline
Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 US 50, 59 & n 10 (1982) (“The independence
from political forces . . . helps to promote public confidence in judicial determinations.”).
338 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies,
65 Duke L J 1, 54 (2015).

2018]

Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law

73

the federal courts and secured to the Supreme Court almost
unfettered discretion over its caseload, near-plenary authority to
set its own agenda, and freedom to determine how and why it
would intervene on matters of national salience.339
Yet it is far from clear that the fruits of the discretion
achieved by Taft and other advocates for the institutional judiciary necessarily promote useful constitutional ends. As Professor
Pamela Karlan succinctly explains, “Judges should be independent, not so much so that they can conceive goals and policies of their
own and realize them, but so that they can enforce the goals and
policies embodied in the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
democratic branches.”340 But, as one of us has argued, bipartisan
coalitions of the Supreme Court have narrowed dramatically the
range of constitutional remedies available to criminal defendants,
prisoners challenging their convictions via habeas corpus, and ordinary citizens engaged in retail encounters with the state.341 The
same trend can be observed in the context of statutory civil-rights
remedies.342 That these restrictive transformations have a “long
and bipartisan pedigree”343 is suggestive of their institutional
roots: they reflect the judiciary’s institutional interest in stanching the flow of certain kinds of litigation.344
As a consequence of institutional loyalties, individual rights’
holders are no longer able to vindicate entitlements through ex post
remedies in federal court.345 Viewed in this light, institutional loyalties in the Article III context are, paradoxically, inconsistent
with promotion of the constitutional rule of law and at odds with
conventional notions of corrective justice and deterrence.

339 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
after the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643, 1660–84 (2000) (documenting these
changes). See also generally Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political
Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J Polit 73 (2007) (emphasizing the role of Taft’s personal efforts).
340 Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 Georgetown L J 1041, 1043 (2007).
341 For synoptic accounts of remedial contraction, see Huq, 65 Duke L J at 12–40 (cited
in note 338); Sarah Staszak, No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial
Retrenchment 31–34 (Oxford 2015).
342 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 Cal L Rev 1, 23 (2006) (noting “judges’ unwillingness to engage in rigorous scrutiny
of [subjective-practices] business structures” in employment discrimination cases).
343 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?,
114 Mich L Rev 893, 904 (2016).
344 Huq, 65 Duke L J at 63–67 (cited in note 338).
345 Ex ante remedies are unavailable for most retail constitutional wrongs, because
most citizens cannot predict official action against them.
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What might be done, then, to mitigate forms of judicial selfregard with unwelcome implications for constitutional rights’
holders? Setting aside the pressing question of how such reform
might occur, we develop one suggestion here in some detail.
Since 1886, Congress has fashioned separate adjudicative
mechanisms “for the bringing of suits against the Government of
the United States.”346 In respect to remedies that can be granted
through a freestanding adjudicative process—rather than, say, as
incidental proceedings embedded within a criminal prosecution—
it would be desirable to create a specialized court staffed by an
institutionally distinct cadre of judges. The advantage of such a
bespoke cadre of judges is the fostering of a discrete and separate
institutional mandate from that of Article III. Legislators might
leverage the focal-point effect provided by a new jurisdictional
statute, assigning cases to a discrete pool of judges separately and
distinctly charged with the vindication of constitutional and civil
rights.
Congress might model this new judicial arm on the bankruptcy bench, although a new “remedies bench” should have
plenary Article III protection. The bankruptcy courts have successfully exhibited “Article III values” as a consequence of a
social-network effect—a “continued connection to an audience[,]
the bankruptcy bar”—that “holds in high esteem professional,
creative, and non-ideological resolution of complex disputes.”347 To
leverage the same sort of social-network effect, Congress might
employ an entrance rule—a requirement that appointees to this
have litigated in the past on behalf of a constitutional right or a
statutory civil right. In contrast to the current federal courts,
which are dominated by former federal prosecutors,348 the resulting bench would come to public service already aligned to the
institutional goal of providing remedies to individuals harmed by
346 Tucker Act, 24 Stat 505 (1887). See also United States v Mitchell, 463 US 206,
213–15 (1983) (discussing the history of the Tucker Act, and treating it as a waiver of
sovereign immunity); Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 896–904 (Foundation 7th ed 2015) (cataloguing various statutory
waivers of federal immunity).
347 Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts,
62 Stan L Rev 747, 752 (2010).
348 See Bob Egelko, Obama Nominations Heavy on Ex-Prosecutors (SF Chron, Feb 3,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/87JF-ACSY (noting that former prosecutors constituted
45.7 percent of President Obama’s judicial nominees, 44.7 percent of President George W.
Bush’s judicial nominees, 40.7 percent of President Bill Clinton’s judicial nominees, 37.3
percent of President George H.W. Bush’s judicial nominees, and 40.8 percent of President
Ronald Reagan’s judicial nominees).
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the government’s unconstitutional or unlawful actions. It would
also be entangled from the start in social networks in which the
social value of individualized remediation for constitutional
wrongs is well understood.
We are, of course, under no illusions that Congress as currently constituted is about to expend effort on behalf of a dispersed
and hardly high-status population of constitutional rights’ holders (although we are also of the view that legal scholars should
not self-censor based on present political realities).349 Our point
here is rather to demonstrate that the causal mechanisms we
have identified in Part II—entrance and exit rules, institutional
mandates, and social networks—have a continuing role to play in
refining our federal institutions toward public-regarding constitutional ends.
C.

Congress “Redivivus”?

It is common ground that Congress today is characterized by
a “radical separation between the two major political parties.”350
Regardless of whether ideological bifurcation within Congress
reflects changes in public preferences,351 there is a measure of consensus today that a polarized Congress does not, and cannot,
serve the nation well.352 Similarly, there is a widespread view that
lobbyists possess too much influence in Congress, with many believing that special-interest bribery is just “[t]he way things work
in Congress.”353
349 Bubb and Pildes, 127 Harv L Rev at 1678 (cited in note 304) (noting the “risks” of
such an approach to scholarship).
350 Pildes, 99 Cal L Rev at 276 (cited in note 171).
351 Compare Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy 49–57 (Yale 2010) (arguing that polarization of elites
drives legislative polarization), with Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War? at 19 (cited
in note 93) (rejecting the popular polarization thesis).
352 For a representative version of this complaint in the legal academy, see Gillian E.
Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum L Rev 1739, 1749 (2015)
(decrying the “growing range of contexts in which a majority of legislators would prefer to
alter the policy status quo but lack the numbers to overcome the objections of the President
or a Senate minority”). For a related criticism of the accompanying gridlock, see Michael
J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 Notre
Dame L Rev 2217, 2218–19 (2013) (decrying legislative inaction in the face of a pressing
need to make substantive policy decisions).
353 See CBS News/NY Times Poll—Congress, the Abramoff Scandals, and the Alito
Nomination (CBS News, Jan 26, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/DT58-URN9; Lydia
Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds (Gallup, Apr 11,
2011), online at http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/americans-decry-power-lobbyists
-corporations-banks-feds.aspx (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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These two popular diagnoses are not wholly consonant with
one another.354 Nonetheless, they suggest broad agreement on one
point: legislators are excessively motivated by partisan and ideological355 interests, perhaps as well as by pure pecuniary ones.
Concomitantly, institutional loyalty seems in short supply on
Capitol Hill. Scholars since Professor John Hart Ely have doubted
Congress’s ability “to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful
authority” against the executive branch.356 Our analysis in this
Section stipulates, as a baseline matter, an insufficiently institutionally loyal legislative branch. How might the repertoire of
design modifications canvassed in Part II inform efforts to reform
a Congress of that sort? We develop a potential avenue of reform
that employs many of the mechanisms we identified in Part II,
although we are under no illusions about the intractability of the
task.
We focus on congressional staff, not legislators themselves.
The legislature’s entrance and exit rules for such staff might be
reformed to create an executive-branch-style congressional civil
service durably disposed toward the institution of Congress.357
Legal scholars focus on the optimal distribution of civil servants
versus political appointees in the executive branch. The parallel
question in the legislative-branch context receives scant attention. Scholars like Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman
have started to fill this void by offering thick descriptions of
congressional staffers’ beliefs and behavior.358 We build here on

354 On the one hand, Congress is viewed as excessively influenced by a single cabal of
moneyed interests. On the other hand, Congress is perceived not as unified by any one
interest, but as divided by the two-party system. If you think that Congress is both
hyperpartisan and also in the grip of special interests, that is, your account of Congress is
somewhat internally contradictory.
355 But see Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2065,
2076–77 (2013) (arguing that parties have incentives to moderate positions over time).
356 John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its
Aftermath 52 (Princeton 1993).
357 The call for something like a congressional civil service is at least seventy years
old. See Thomas I. Emerson, Book Review, Reviews: Congress at the Crossroads. By George
B. Galloway, 56 Yale L J 1094, 1094 (1947) (describing “well-handled hearings and [a]
report” calling for more professional congressional civil service leading to some, smaller
reforms).
358 See generally Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation,
and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan L Rev 725 (2014). For an earlier, related article, with a
smaller sample size, see Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
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Gluck and Bressman’s impressive work by considering ways to
strengthen staffers’ institutional loyalty.
Constitutional doctrine already recognizes that congressional
staff matter. As the Supreme Court has recognized, senators’ and
representatives’ aides in particular possess a measure of authority that rivals, and perhaps sometimes even surpasses, that of
executive-branch officials.359 Elected officials in Congress spend
large portions of their time on election-related tasks.360 They
spend much of their time outside of Washington and hence away
from the daily legislative activities in Congress.361 They hence depend on staffers, who often act as their agents during intrabranch
negotiations362 and as their conduit to constituents and lobbyists.363
Because there are comparatively few staffers in Congress, each
staffer can wield substantial power.364 The increasing complexity
of policy, moreover, means that legislators as principals can
imperfectly monitor the myriad choices staffers as agents are
constantly making.
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575, 582–90 (2002). Political scientists have been more interested in the congressional civil service. See, for example,
Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government 11–24 (Basic 1980); Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, Why Congress
Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself (The Atlantic, Mar 10, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/TFA5-BT5H.
359 Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 616–17 (1972):
[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative
process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative
concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work
of such aides is so critical to the Members’ performance that they must be treated
as the latter’s alter egos.
360 See Philip M. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy 118 (Pantheon 1988) (quoting a member of Congress stating that around the times of elections he spends “eighty
percent of [his] time” at fundraisers).
361 One report found that members were spending just 56 percent of their time in
Washington. See Lisa Desjardins, Congress in D.C. Far Less Than It Used to Be (CNN,
Aug 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/36RJ-EK27. Congress meets only about 140 days
per calendar year. Members of Congress have fewer staff members in Washington relative
to in their district offices than they used to previously. See Keeping Congress Competent:
Staff Pay, Turnover, and What It Means for Democracy (Sunlight Foundation), archived
at http://perma.cc/WV2Z-JCPV.
362 See Gravel, 408 US at 616–17.
363 Hasen, 64 Stan L Rev at 219 (cited in note 224); Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer
A. Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerks?, 41 Am J Polit
Sci 1251, 1271 (1997).
364 There are over two million executive-branch civil servants. See Recent Trends at
*16 (cited in note 203). For every 200 to 250 executive-branch officials, there is 1 congressional official. See Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress *4 (AEI 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/U7TX-EY7N.
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Empowerment, however, does not translate into an institutional orientation. Congressional staffers are usually divided into
one of two categories. There are “personal staff” who work for the
representative or senator directly, and “committee staff” (often
called “professional staff”)365 who work for the House or Senate
committee. To begin with, the selection and promotion rules for
staffers—including so-called professional staffers—do not conduce
currently to positive loyalty toward Congress as an institution.
Neither competitive examinations nor objective merit-related
criteria are employed in hiring most congressional staffers akin
to those used in the civil service.366 Aides instead are hired by
representatives and senators based on their loyalty toward their
immediate boss, their political party, and their ideology. Often,
staffers are evaluated on the basis of past performance in the
quite different context of a congressional campaign.367 The number of professional staff has been declining substantially over the
years.368 Professional staff are usually hired through partisan networks anyway, with few exceptions. And while executive-branch
civil servants are promoted based on criteria favoring the more
institutionally disposed,369 most congressional staffers do not last
long enough to be meaningfully promoted.370 An important exception, we note, is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), one of the
products of the 1974 framework budget legislation,371 and an institution expressly modeled on the executive branch’s operation.372

365 See Bressman and Gluck, 66 Stan L Rev at 728–29 (cited in note 358) (referencing
the existence of “nonpartisan, professional staff” as a discrete category).
366 See notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
367 See Terry Carmack, How to Get a Job on Capitol Hill (Politico, Aug 4, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/QTA3-NSH2.
368 See Drutman and Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists (cited in note 358)
(“[Speaker of the House] Gingrich cut committee staff by a third, reduced the legislative
support staff by a third, and killed the Office of Technology Assessment.”).
369 See text accompanying notes 197–205.
370 Senate staffers work for the Senate for an average of five years. See Senate Staff
Employment Data: 1991–2001 (Congressional Management Foundation), archived at
http://perma.cc/2852-P3EJ. House staffers last even less time than that. See Craig Schultz
and Richard Shapiro, 1994 U.S. House of Representatives Employment Practices: A Study
of Staff Salary, Tenure, Demographics and Benefits *5 (Congressional Management
Foundation, 1994), archived at http://perma.cc/TK6L-EFLW. Recall again that—with a
real civil-service structure—executive-branch civil servants last several times longer than
that. See Recent Trends at *17 (cited in note 203).
371 See text accompanying notes 160–64.
372 Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowery, The First Decade of the Congressional Budget
Act: Legislative Imitation and Adaptation in Budgeting, 18 Polit Sci 313, 315–16 (1985).
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Further, exit-related dynamics do not foster meaningful
institutional loyalties to Congress. There are no intrinsic rewards
to identifying with Congress as an institution. Congress remains
much maligned by public opinion.373 Material returns to congressional service are also low. Congressional staffers are poorly paid,
work long hours, and usually can be removed at any time—most
importantly when their elected boss retires or loses reelection.374
Instead, staffers have rich exit options in both the executive
branch and the private sector. For those driven by partisan or
ideological goals, there are enormous returns to going to work for
the executive, especially in comparison to the contemporary
Congress.375 An executive-branch position may allow the former
staffer to help draft regulations or litigate path-making cases.
Both may carry more policy heft, and more intrinsic appeal, than
legislative trench warfare. Private-sector lobbying positions, in
contrast, offer not only the potential for influence, but also substantially higher salaries. Staffers routinely double their salary
by defecting to the private sector.376 For staffers whose former
bosses remain in office, lobbying work is especially lucrative.377
This creates an incentive for earlier rather than later exit from
public service.
Compounding the institutional-loyalty deficit, congressional
staffers do not organize around the singular institutional
mandates that generate loyal officials in some agencies and
departments in the executive branch.378 Congress has a broad and
diffuse portfolio of responsibilities, not the focused portfolio of a
single-mission institution.379 Members of Congress do not usually
373 For aggregate data, see Congress and the Public (Gallup), online at http://www.gallup
.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
374 See Schultz and Shapiro, 1994 U.S. House of Representatives Employment Practices at *5 (cited in note 370).
375 See David J. Samuels, Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and
Party Organization and Behavior, 35 Comp Polit Stud 461, 462 (2002) (“Under presidentialism, the possibility of capturing the executive branch . . . may become parties’ driving
goal.”).
376 See Drutman and Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists (cited in note 358).
377 Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door
Lobbyists, 102 Am Econ Rev 3731, 3739–46 (2012) (finding that lobbyists who are former
staffers lose, on average, about 25 percent of their salaries when their former legislative
boss leaves office).
378 See Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298, 406 (DC Cir 1981).
379 See Gersen, 96 Va L Rev at 303 (cited in note 79) (“There is one Congress that
exercises the legislative function for all policy domains rather than two Congresses, one
for foreign affairs and one for domestic affairs. Functions are separated and substantive
powers are bundled together within each function.”).
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divide portfolios within their offices along discrete policy lines.
Personal staff will cover a range of political and policy portfolios,
and given the shortage of staff members, those dedicated to policy
matters will usually have multiple and diverse policy issues in
their portfolios.380
Committee staff are unified by their nominal commitment to
the mandate of their committee. Committee mandates, though, are
(perhaps purposefully) broad.381 They might perceive themselves as
part of the policy community that is within their committee’s
jurisdiction—a lawyer for the Senate Judiciary Committee, for
instance, feels part of the legal community. This is limited,
though, because committee staffers that are hired and fired by
majority or minority members will feel that their “mandate” is
ultimately to serve whatever their member says, rather than to
serve or shape a discrete policy mandate or professional community.
Stronger institutional loyalty among congressional staff
might be cultivated in several different ways. At the entry stage,
the democratic accountability of members of Congress means that
significant numbers of staffers are and should be hired by the
members that will employ them. A larger number of positions,
though, can be filled by professional staff working for committees
than presently is the case. Committees do not feature staffers
with sufficient institutional loyalties to power the institutional
autonomy of Congress, but committee staffers are still at the
greatest remove of any current staffers from the sway of elected
officials.382 Civil-service examinations akin to those required for
many executive-branch positions can be required to join committee staff.
Alternatively, the relevant professional community can offer
its evaluation of the professional competence of the potential
staffer. For instance, the American Bar Association plays an

380 See, for example, Office of Representative Keith Ellison, Legislative Assistant
Opening (Democratic Whip), archived at http://perma.cc/NEA7-CK4X; Office of Congressman
Al Green, Job Announcement: Legislative Assistant (Democratic Whip), archived at
http://perma.cc/3AGL-VPE2.
381 See, for example, Jurisdiction (Senate Committee on the Judiciary), archived at
http://perma.cc/7NVM-ELNG (“In addition to its critical role in providing oversight of the
Department of Justice and the agencies under the Department’s jurisdiction, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security, the
Judiciary Committee plays an important role in the consideration of nominations and
pending legislation.”).
382 See Bressman and Gluck, 66 Stan L Rev at 729 (cited in note 358) (stating that
“nonpartisan, professional staffers [ ] are not directly accountable to members”).
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important role evaluating the credentials of judicial nominees.383
It might also evaluate the credentials of those applying for a
position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Committee staffers
might be approved only by a vote of either the other staffers
and/or the members of the committee. This could lead to the
selection of committee staffers on a partisan basis, just like other
nominees that come to a committee vote. However, inducing partisan warfare over committee staff generates an opportunity cost
that prevents committees from dealing with more substantial
issues engulfed by partisan warfare, such as judicial nominees.
The more time spent debating the next committee counsel for the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the less time available for debating
the next nominee to the US Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Modifying exit incentives for staffers would also help generate
institutional loyalty. Stronger returns to remaining in Congress
can also make a difference for congressional staffers. Congress
enjoys the power of the purse, but opens that purse more to similarly situated executive-branch officials than to their congressional counterparts. A lawyer working for the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)—even if that lawyer is not in a leadership position at the SEC—can make over $200,000 a year.384
The senior Democratic lawyer on the Senate Judiciary Committee,
a veteran of several decades, made roughly 80 percent of that
working on the nomination of then-Judge Neil Gorsuch to succeed
Justice Scalia and determine the future of the Supreme Court.385
Exit-related constraints on postemployment lobbying in the
private sector, in particular in relation to issues on which a
former staffer worked, would also shift the expected payoffs of
exit versus continued service in Congress.386 The draw of working
for the executive branch can be reduced by constraints on postemployment opportunities in the other branches of government.
Rather than staffers contemplating what will make them an

383 See Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President’s List for Judgeships (NY Times,
Nov 22, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/screening-panel
-rejects-many-obama-picks-for-federal-judgeships.html (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
384 See August Jackson, SEC Enforcement Lawyers’ Salary (Chron), archived at
http://perma.cc/L2VC-RWHU.
385 Senate Judiciary Committee Salaries (Legistorm), archived at http://perma.cc/YV7C
-NNWK (noting the salary of Bruce Cohen, a veteran of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
386 For a useful taxonomy of potential lobbying reforms, see Hasen, 64 Stan L Rev at
237–40 (cited in note 224).
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appealing candidate to a K Street lobbying firm or a presidential
candidate or president, constraints on these opportunities upon
leaving Congress will direct their attention toward the legislative
branch.
This reimagined congressional staffing model would also generate more of a focused institutional mandate. Staffers hired to
pursue a discrete policy agenda for a committee would think of
themselves as part of a legislative epistemic community. They
would be evaluated and approved by their fellow committee
members. They would also be evaluated and approved by related
professional communities. Rather than considering what serves
the electoral interests of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the staffer can consider what serves the interests of
the rule of law and Congress’s role in defending it.
Finally, the institutional dispositions of legislators and their
staff might be promoted by narrowing the available scope for
acting on pecuniary motives. Strikingly, the Supreme Court has
recently expanded the scope for legislative self-serving. In its
2016 McDonnell decision, the unanimous Court narrowed the
scope of the “honest services” statute,387 which criminalizes fraudulent deprivations of the “intangible right of honest services.”388
Honest services charges are common in public-corruption cases.389
The McDonnell Court held that the statute applied only when a
defendant official “formal[ly] exercise[d] governmental power . . .
similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.”390 In part, the
Court justified this narrowing gloss with the concern that a broad
public-corruption law would “chill” interactions between constituents and their elected representatives that ought to be protected
by the First Amendment.391 McDonnell undermines efforts to cultivate institutional dispositions because it widens the domain of
387

McDonnell, 136 S Ct at 2365.
18 USC § 1346.
389 A state or federal official can be charged with using the mail or wires to further a
scheme to defraud citizens of their right to the fair, honest, and impartial services of their
public officials. See Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services
Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J Crim L & Crimin 929, 932 (2009) (explaining
the statutory framework). See also Lynne Marek, DOJ May Rein in Use of ‘Honest Services’
Statute (National Law J, June 15, 2009), online at http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
almID/1202431433581/ (visited Oct 29, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (“[Honest services
fraud] was the lead charge lodged by U.S. attorney offices against 79 suspects in fiscal
year 2007, up from 63 in 2005 and 28 in 2000.”).
390 McDonnell, 136 S Ct at 2372.
391 Id.
388
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activity in which representatives can act on pecuniary, rather
than institutional or public-regarding, reasons.392 In contrast, representatives who are insulated from strong external pulls have a
better chance to focus on institutional concerns. Our analysis thus
provides a new ground for critiquing the McDonnell decision and
favoring a broad public-corruption prohibition.393
CONCLUSION
Every organization struggles with how to ensure that its
members act on behalf of its collective or corporate interests. The
molding of atomized, selfish individual actors into committed
institutional loyalists is therefore a problem of organizational
design across academic fields and across our public life. In no
domain of organizational life is this problem more important to
consider, and more difficult to solve perhaps, than in the context
of federal governmental design. When Madison anticipated the
“interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place,”394 therefore, his aspiration was not distinctive
or different from that of many institutional entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, scholars have struggled to visualize how a
Constitution devised before the existence of—and without regard
to—cohesive and polarized political forces and figures could continue to operate. The ensuing modern position is pessimistic. It
implies that when the massive power of the federal government
is in play, partisan, ideological, or selfishly material motives will
392 We bracket here the application of honest services fraud to gifts to a representative’s campaign or PAC, and focus on gifts that enrich a representative in her personal
capacity.
393 Although the Court struck a First Amendment note, we are not convinced this
should be preclusive. To make its First Amendment argument, the Court endorsed a model
of democracy—direct lobbying of elected officials by the public—that key Framers soundly
rejected. McDonnell, 136 S Ct at 2372. See also Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 94 (Cambridge 1997) (noting Madison’s reliance on a “principle of
distinction” to justify representative democracy, and his rejection of direct democracy).
There is therefore little reason to think that lobbying is at the center of the First Amendment.
See Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan L Rev 1131, 1136 (2016)
(concluding that the Petition Clause was not intended to cover activity akin to
contemporary lobbying). There is also some reason to think the decision rests on an infirm
understanding of how quid pro quos distort public action. Carl Hulse, Is the Supreme Court
Naïve about Corruption? Ask Jack Abramoff, NY Times A15 (July 6, 2016) (quoting former
lobbyist Jack Abramoff: “When somebody petitioning a public servant for action provides
any kind of extra resources—money or a gift or anything—that affects the process”).
394 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3) (advocating “giving to those who administer
each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist
encroachments of the others”).
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dominate. Institutional concerns will trail in their wake. Our
constitutional system works as it was supposed to only when what
really motivates officials coincidentally overlaps with constitutional principles. When partisan, ideological, or even crudely
materialistic interests conflict with constitutional principles,
damage is done to these principles. At a singular, extreme moment,
or with gradual deterioration, this could mean the disappearance
of these ancient and valued principles.
We think this modern position can be supplemented.
Branches, no less than private associations, can and do cultivate
loyal, well-disposed officials capably motivated to act on the
institution’s behalf. These “constitutional rights of the place”
must be consciously cultivated by careful institutional design,
and not simply assumed (or assumed away).395 To that end, we
have identified and taxonomized four mechanisms capable of
nurturing institutional loyalty. Properly deployed, these tools of
institutional loyalty have the potential to play a meaningful role
in ensuring that our national institutions operate as more than a
blind crashing together of conflicting partisan forces.
Madison was right that “parchment barriers”396 will not protect
us when our “dependence on the people”397 produces the forces or
figures that the modern position fears and that threaten institutional boundaries. Our Constitution is not a “machine that would
go of itself.”398 But Madison was also right that we are not without
hope when ideological or partisan passions overwhelm fragile
institutional boundaries.399 It is at those moments that our system
includes within it other tools to ensure that institutional boundaries persist and persevere. The ambition of this Article has been
to demonstrate the importance and utility of institutional loyalty
as one of these tools to ensure the constitutional machine still
works even in moments of stress.

395

Id.
Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332, 333 (cited in note 3).
397 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
398 See generally Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution
in American Culture (Routledge 2017).
399 See Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3).
396

